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This publication contains analysis of the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey and the Labour 
Force Survey Five-Quarter Longitudinal Dataset, 
both produced by the Office for National Statis-
tics (ONS), under Crown Copyright.
Additional analysis has used the Skills and Em-
ployment Survey 1986-2012 dataset produced 
by Felstead, Gallie and Green with funding most 
recently from the Economic and Social Research 
Council, the UK Commission for Employment 
and Skills, and the Wales Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, Data and Methods.
These data sources were accessed under 
licence, through the UK Data Archive 
http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/
Additional analysis of ONS statistical data, again 
Crown Copyright, were accessed through the 
Nomis service at the University of Durham 
http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
Four further datasets have been used for 
analysis  in this report. First, the European 
Labour Force Survey through the Eurostat bulk 
download facility 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/bulkdownload
Second, the World Management Survey 
2004-2010 dataset produced by Bloom, 
Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen, available from  
http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/ 
Third, the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) Survey of Adult 
Skills 2013 public use files, available from  
http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/
Fourth, the UK Commission for Employment 
and Skills’ Employer Skills Survey 2013, dataset 
available upon application, with detailed analysis 
accessible at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ 
ukces-employer-skills-survey-2013
Analysis used R 3.1.2 with packages including 
ggplot2, ggthemes, knitr, memisc, and tidyr.
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Economic outlook
The UK economy has been growing robustly 
since the start of 2013, and looks set to 
continue into the future. But the recession 
was deeper and longer than we’d experienced, 
and for a variety of reasons, recovery took 
longer than usual to gather pace. In contrast 
to previous recessions, productivity was set 
back greatly and has yet to recover; it is some 
14 percentage points behind where it would’ve 
been if it had kept its pre-recession trend.
In aggregate, the labour market has performed 
well in recession and recovery. Unemployment 
did not rise to the heights that were feared 
given the depths of the recession, and since 
late 2012, increased job creation has pulled 
unemployment towards pre-recession 
levels; it is now 5.7 per cent.
But while job creation is impressive, real wages 
fell in the recession and have declined and 
stagnated until the end of 2014, when we have 
finally seen some growth. There are many 
dimensions to the decline of real wages, 
but we know that in the long run workers’ 
pay will be likely to grow in line with pro-
ductivity. Understanding how improved skills 
and talents can drive productivity is therefore 
critical.
High-skilled opportunity
Employment growth after the recession 
was strongest in temporary and part-time 
work, leading to concerns about declining job 
quality. However, more recently, full-time and 
permanent employment have led growth; 
as the labour market tightens, we are likely 
to continue to see a recovery in more secure 
work. Even after the post-recession rise, the UK 
has below-western European average levels of 
temporary and involuntary part-time work.
The number of high-skilled jobs – for managers, 
professionals, associate professionals and tech-
nicians – was not hit by the recession and has 
grown robustly for much of the time since then. 
From 2006 to 2013, the UK added 2.2m high-
skilled jobs out of 5.1m added across the 
EU, more than any other member state.
The UK now has one of the largest graduate 
workforces in the EU, and one of the largest 
shares of high-skilled jobs in employment. 
Long term trends look set to continue favouring 
growth in these sorts of roles, making the 
sustained supply of new skills into the labour 
market an ongoing priority.
Summary
In November 2014, the UK Commission for Employment and Skills published 
Growth through People: a statement on skills in the UK. There we set out a 
comprehensive review of the key issues facing the UK’s employment and 
skills system, and offered concrete proposals for action to tackle those issues. 
Growth through People offers a new consensus, backed by the CBI and the TUC 
and a range of other employer and education organisations. That consensus 
is founded on the UK Commission’s latest labour market research and 
intelligence. In this paper, we present the evidence and analysis behind the 
Growth through People proposals.
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The hourglass labour market
Alongside high-skilled jobs, service-intensive 
jobs – especially in the care and leisure sectors 
– have grown through much of the recession 
and recovery period. The recession’s job 
losses were concentrated in middle-skill 
clerical and skilled trades roles, as well as 
labour-intensive jobs; employment in these 
categories remains below pre-recession levels, 
despite a slight recovery in the past year.
These changes also reflect long term trends, 
going back over several decades: more high-
skill and service-intensive roles, fewer mid-
dle-skill and labour-intensive roles. These 
are the consequences of the often-dis-
cussed ‘hourglass’ trend, driven by trade and 
technology.
For those with limited skills and qualifications, 
growth in service-intensive roles represents the 
fastest growing opportunities. But service-in-
tensive roles are often less attractive than 
the middle-skill roles we’ve been losing. 
Middle-skill jobs, including administrative and 
skilled trades roles, offer pay levels in line with 
the national average, while service-intensive 
roles are tend to be less well-paid.
The decline in middle-skill work isn’t 
equally shared among less qualified people. 
Existing middle-skill workers often move onto 
other roles, moving up as well as down when 
displaced. But that means openings into 
middle-skill roles are difficult to get from the 
outside, highlighted by a declining share of 
younger workers relative to the total workforce.
That raises concerns about limits on mobility 
up the career ladder for the less skilled and 
less qualified. Yet mobility is all the more critical 
when the premium paid for skills is high in 
the UK, with better-than-OECD average pay 
for the highly-skilled and lower-than-OECD 
average pay for those with the lowest skills.
Skills and workplace performance
Productivity was hit hard in recession, but our 
workforce has never been more qualified, as 
demographic change adds in new workers with 
greater opportunities for higher education, 
as well as vocational training. How can this 
happen? The data suggest that the big hit 
was on ‘Total Factor Productivity’ – all of the 
different factors which shape our ability to turn 
inputs into outputs.
One big part of TFP is the ‘black box’ of the 
workplace, and how employers turn skilled 
workers and tools into products and services 
which customers value. We may have a more 
qualified and – if qualifications are of good 
quality – a more skilled workforce, but are 
those skills being used effectively? It seems 
that as world markets have become more 
difficult in the past decade, many of our work-
places have struggled to adapt.
The UK has a ‘long tail’ of poorly managed 
businesses. When businesses’ management 
practices are assessed, the UK has a healthy 
proportion in the top quartile international-
ly, but also many in the bottom quartile. By 
contrast, the US has many more in the top 
quartile than the bottom quartile, and Germany 
and France have many in the top quartile 
and in the middle of the range. We know 
too that those employers with ambition and 
commitment to innovation are far more likely to 
invest in and adopt high performance working 
practices. 
Research by the OECD highlights that the 
UK has difficulty in getting its younger 
businesses to ‘scale up’. In most advanced 
economies, total employment declines in busi-
nesses over 5 years old, in the UK it increases. 
But that means our younger businesses make a 
smaller contribution than in other countries – a 
pattern which continued through recession.
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Opportunity and performance are linked
Many workplaces could be working better 
if they were managed better. With its large 
number of micro businesses, the UK has a 
higher share of managerial employees than 
many other countries. Whereas managers 
in other advanced economies tend to be 
much better qualified than the rest of the 
workforce, this is much less true in the UK. 
Businesses report that managers are the occu-
pational group least likely to receive training.
The new technology driving the hourglass 
trends allows businesses to perform many 
tasks with fewer skilled employees. But many 
businesses seem to want to diminish their use 
of skill in the workplace to offset their own 
management limitations. The number of UK 
employees reporting their jobs being able 
to be performed with only primary-level 
education is higher than in most other 
advanced economies.
This problem of skills underuse is not confined 
only to those with low skills. 30 per cent of 
graduates find themselves in jobs which don’t 
require their education. But it is those with 
intermediate level qualifications who are 
most likely to find themselves overskilled or 
overqualified for the jobs they do.
Exploring workplace practice, we find again 
a ‘long tail’, with too many establishments 
limited in training and offering their 
employees little variety or autonomy in 
their work. If the UK is to see lasting gains in 
productivity, it will need to see some of these 
workplaces investing in and making use of their 
employees’ skills, pursuing a high performance 
working culture that nurtures and harnesses 
talent.
Skills and the wider economy
The poor use of skills would not be as 
damaging were it not for the persistent 
presence of skills shortages in the UK. 
Evidence demonstrates that skills shortages 
– where businesses cannot recruit the 
skilled people they need – hinder produc-
tivity performance. And we know that many 
times more of the existing workforce have gaps 
in the skills they need to be proficient in their 
jobs.
While significant proportions of employers 
cite a desire to do more, there is limited 
movement on measures of training and de-
velopment activity, and indeed some signs 
of decline. Meanwhile, many businesses report 
a high level of underemployed staff – approx-
imately 4 million workers across the UK, with 
somebody underemployed in half of all work-
places.
These problems exist in different ways in 
different parts of the country. The growing 
disparity between local economies is seen 
in growing difference between labour 
markets. Between 2004 and 2012, London 
extended its lead relative to the UK average in 
productivity, while most of the rest of the UK 
fell further behind. 
Much of London’s advantage lies in its deep 
high-skilled labour market; a majority of 
London’s workforce have high-level qual-
ifications. As other areas develop their 
high-skilled labour market, they can soon 
encounter barriers from skills shortages 
and skills gaps.
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Future prospects
An oversimplified summary of the story 
would be: The UK has a fair share of compet-
itive businesses, which are managed well and 
generate a large quantity of high-skilled jobs 
which have helped absorb the more qualified 
workforce. But at the same time, too many 
employers face limited competitive pressure to 
improve and have limited incentive to manage 
effectively and make the best use of talent. 
Instead, many of these employers seek to 
de-skill job roles and their employees find little 
opportunity to apply and develop their skills, 
and have few prospects for pay and progres-
sion.
We can continue to improve the skills of the 
UK workforce, but unless we can be sure 
that workplaces are going to use them, the 
impact on productivity will be muted. We 
need to ensure the opportunity to develop in-
dividuals’ skills to provide the means for their 
career progression, but they will need jobs that 
can use those skills.
The UK has not been unique in having its 
productivity set back by the past recession, 
but it has been one of the harder hit. Some 
of the progress in catching up with other 
advanced economies has been reversed, so 
that labour productivity in the UK is some 
distance behind that of the US, France 
or Germany. Tackling these issues of the 
workplace, and ensuring complementary im-
provements to ensure that education delivers 
relevant, work-ready skills, will be critical if we 
are to make up that lost ground.
Growth through People
Our Growth through People proposals set out 
some of what will be needed, a consensus 
shaped by, and backed by, employers, 
employees and the education sector. Progress 
will require collaboration and a commit-
ment to long-term changes. The five recom-
mended areas for action are:
  Employers should lead on skills and govern-
ment should enable them
  Improving workplace productivity should be 
recognised as the key route to increasing 
pay and prosperity
  ‘Earning and learning’ should be the gold 
standard in vocational education
  Education and employers should be better 
connected to prepare people for work
  Success should be measured by a wider set 
of outcomes not just educational attainment
Growth through People: Evidence and Analysis 
offers an overview of some of the key issues 
in the UK labour market, drawing on UKCES 
and others’ research. It helps to provide 
context to those proposals, but also a founda-
tion for further inquiry into the major trends 
in our labour market, the consequences they 
have, and the opportunities they present.
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In November 2014, we published a statement 
of the key policy challenges and recommenda-
tions on how to tackle them, Growth through 
People.1 As a platform for action on productiv-
ity, wages and social mobility, Growth through 
People represents a consensus, supported not 
just by the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) and Trades Union Congress (TUC), but by 
a range of other employer, workforce and edu-
cational voices.
Behind the thinking for Growth through People 
was the UK Commission’s intelligence on the 
operation of the labour market. Drawing on 
a range of local, national and international 
evidence, in this paper we present an overview 
on what that intelligence tells us about recent 
and emerging trends.
While only an overview, we aim to be com-
prehensive. Too often, discussions about 
the labour market set workplaces, education 
and government in separate silos. Here, we 
try to look past those boundaries, to give an 
end-to-end view of the labour market as an 
employment and skills system.
Our concern is with the long term questions. 
Many of the most critical challenges we face will 
continue long after recovery from recession; 
and many date back over a decade and more. 
Their deep-seated nature is why we need the 
consensus and lasting commitment proposed 
in Growth through People; and why we also need 
to look closely at the causes and complications 
at work, which is our purpose in this paper.
1 UKCES (2014a).
Jobs-rich, but pay-poor?2
The good news is that times in the labour 
market have changed, substantially for the 
better. Since the start of 2013, the economy 
has seen a return to sustained growth and 
falling unemployment.
The prospects are for growth to continue. 
Although there remain potential internation-
al headwinds, recent falls in energy prices 
will offer a further boost to households and 
businesses.
The combination of economic growth matched 
with a rapid fall in unemployment has repre-
sented a welcome change from the previous 
two recoveries. But if recovery so far has been 
strong in jobs, it has also been weak in terms 
of wages. Pay has seen a sustained real-terms 
fall for much of the period during and since 
recession; the decline only now seems to be 
coming to an end.
The long decline in pay is also a departure 
from previous experience. It helps us to see 
that while we are making progress in tackling 
the problems of recession and recovery, 
there remains lots of work to do to improve 
prospects for lasting gains in living standards. 
Overall, we can see that the UK employment 
and skills system has demonstrated some 
significant strengths, but there are signs of 
deep-seated weakness: our purpose here is to 
help locate them and understand their causes.
2 The description is from Haldane (2014).
Introduction
Headlines
  Economic fortunes have changed for the better, with sustained growth and falling unemployment.
  But there remain long-term concerns about the operation of the employment and skills system.
  Many issues have national implications, but effects are concentrated on certain groups or local areas.
  Many challenges have deep roots and required concerted, lasting changes if they are to be tackled.
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Different dimensions
In the following pages, we explore the em-
ployment and skills system through different 
dimensions. We start at the aggregate level: we 
look at the changing context provided by our 
growing economy. Finally we have growth, we 
have falling unemployment – but pay remains a 
problem, and closely linked with it, productivity.
Then we turn to look at the new jobs growth 
is creating. Contrary to speculation, many of 
these jobs are high-skill. There has been a sub-
stantial increase in unwanted part-time and 
temporary work, but they remain low in com-
parison with many other advanced economies. 
But all that said, the stories at the margins 
suggest there remain acute problems con-
centrated on particular workers: for example, 
youth employment is still well below pre-reces-
sion levels, and workers in low paid jobs have 
limited prospects to move upwards.
We then turn to explore the prospects for 
lasting growth. We look at the role increased 
skills have played in improving the UK’s pro-
ductivity before the recession. But we also also 
probe more deeply into the sharp productivity 
slowdown seen since 2008, and the way that in-
ternational trade and technology trends favour 
future growth in knowledge-intensive and ser-
vice-intensive sectors.
An important backdrop to productivity per-
formance is that we have a workforce which 
has never been so well qualified. If we have a 
better-educated workforce, then we have to 
look at how their talents are being applied: 
the workplace must have played a role in 
that productivity slowdown. The UK has some 
great businesses, but it also has too many poor 
performers – and there is evidence to suggest 
that competition isn’t rooting them out. Too 
few businesses are adopting high performance 
working approaches which could boost their 
productivity.
Success in employment and skills
For the UK Commission, success means 
greater opportunities for the talents and skills 
of people to drive competitiveness, enterprise 
and growth. But what does that mean in more 
tangible and measurable form?
Most of all, it means a successful economy 
characterised by high levels of employment 
and productivity. On the ground, that means 
more people employed in high-quality jobs, 
with good pay, prospects, and an outlet 
for their skills. It’s this combination which 
makes the difference. Greater employment 
in low-quality jobs will often be at the price of 
productivity; but raising productivity by keeping 
less-skilled people out of work helps no one.
GDP, the economy’s total output of goods 
and services, captures much of the total 
progress here: GDP growth reflects some 
combination of more employment or higher 
productivity. In broad terms, where that higher 
productivity reflects the improved productiv-
ity of employees, it should feed through into 
improved earnings.
But there are reasons why GDP growth doesn’t 
always translate as we might want into rising 
living standards: demographic change, shifting 
cost structures and distributional changes can 
all have an effect.1
Such complications in distribution highlight the 
need to ensure that opportunity is open to all, 
regardless of social background or identity. The 
UK saw a large increase in income inequality in 
the 1980s, which has remained since then.
While the UK’s tax and benefits system makes 
a similar impact in reducing income inequality 
as those of other European countries, we start 
from a higher level of inequality in the market 
distribution of income. Some of this reflects a 
wider dispersion of wages with a higher skills 
premium, and some of it reflects the changing 
structure of the labour market, favouring the 
growth of high-skilled work.
1 See the discussion in Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013).
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Changes in trade and technology are also 
reshaping the job roles employers will need 
to fill if they are to compete successfully. They 
favour more high-skilled work, and economic 
growth and demographic change are increas-
ing demand for service roles. At the same time, 
middle-skill roles are declining in number as 
their work is most susceptible to offshoring and 
automation.
These changes have very real consequences 
for opportunity, be it job quality, pay and 
progression. Despite much talk of ‘hollowing 
out’ of the labour market, many of those con-
sequences have been and will continue to be 
positive. We’ve seen graduates find more and 
more graduate work, with all of the benefits 
that brings.
But there are risks. Alongside the new high-
skilled jobs, the UK has a large proportion 
of jobs requiring only very limited skills. Mid-
dle-skill roles have established career pathways 
and are characterised by decent pay and 
prospects; many service roles are character-
ised by low pay and high staff turnover. If mid-
dle-skill roles fall in number, who is affected? 
And what are the effects?
Finally, we turn to look at the direct link 
between skills and performance. The UK 
labour market has persistent skills shortages 
and skills gaps, heavily concentrated in those 
roles critical to future growth opportunities. 
Shortages and gaps have a measurable impact 
on business performance, and yet business 
responses are highly variable: too many busi-
nesses train too few of their workers, and too 
many know that they do. Yet the expansion 
of highly-skilled work is going to require more 
from employers, especially if we are to develop 
the new vocational pathways we look likely to 
need.
Jobs and terminology
This report draws on a range of existing data, 
plus some new analysis we’ve undertaken. 
Sources range from the UK Commission’s own 
Employer Skills Survey, Employer Perspectives 
Survey and Working Futures projections, and 
the UK Skills and Employment Surveys (espe-
cially from 1997 to 2012). We also use a range 
of economic and labour market data provided 
by the Office of National Statistics (ONS), 
including especially the Labour Force Survey.
We use sector and size breakdowns to under-
stand businesses, but much of our focus here 
is on the changing nature of work. For that 
reason, we use the ONS Standard Occupation-
al Classification (SOC) for consistent analysis of 
job roles. SOC has changed over time, and so 
we used a ‘crosswalk’ procedure to translate 
past data into the current classification, which 
is called SOC 2010. 
Similar to other analyses, we seek to further 
simplify the SOC occupational structure by 
dividing the 9 SOC Major Groups into four 
broad groups:
  High-skill: Managers and senior officials; 
professionals; associate professionals and 
technicians. (SOC 1-3)
  Middle-skill: Administrative and secretarial; 
skilled trades. (SOC 4&5)
  Service-intensive: Care, leisure and other 
service; sales and customer service. (SOC 
6&7)
  Labour-intensive: Process, plant and 
machine operatives, and elementary occu-
pations. (SOC 8&9)
We also use some international data, from 
Eurostat (the European Union statistical 
agency) and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). For 
these, we use the slightly different International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-
08). Here, High-skill is ISCO 1-3; Middle-skill is 
ISCO 4, 6 and 7; Service-intensive is ISCO 5 and 
Labour-intensive is ISCO 8 and 9.
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Macro trends...
The overall story is shaped by lasting changes 
to the global economic environment. New 
technology seems to be arriving at an acceler-
ating pace, allowing greater opportunities for 
automation and breaking down barriers for 
economic cooperation across borders.
At the same time, the populous emerging 
economies – especially China and India – are 
increasingly becoming the motor of global 
growth. With rapid development and heavy 
investments in education, these countries are 
able to play an increasing role in higher value 
markets which a generation ago would have 
been considered the exclusive preserve of the 
advanced economies.
Together, these macro trends are transform-
ing the world of work: a higher premium is 
attached to skills and knowledge, and a need 
for innovation and adaptation has become the 
norm for many businesses in operating in com-
petitive world markets.
The consequences of this shift are apparent 
across the different aspects of the employment 
and skills system. If the UK fails to develop the 
highly-skilled workforce we need, then growth 
opportunities will be taken elsewhere. If British 
businesses fail to develop and apply the talents 
of their workforce, and engage their employees’ 
best efforts, they will lose the edge they need 
to lead in these newly competitive markets.
It’s on this last point that action looks most 
important. While the UK needs to do much 
more to improve the prospects of the low-
skilled, the growth in the high-skilled workforce 
represents a great success we must sustain. 
Yet the decline and stagnation of productivity 
since 2008 shows that we still have plenty of 
room to apply those skills much better – which 
is why in this paper we give so much room to 
consider the role of the workplace.
... and micro stories
Few of the questions we highlight in these 
pages lend themselves to straightforward 
answers. That’s because the national picture 
aggregates up from much more localised and 
individual stories of success and failure, oppor-
tunity and risk. Within local areas and industry 
sectors there are always pecularities and com-
binations of problems which make neat, one-
size-fits-all solutions only rarely effective.
It’s for that reason that in the UK Commis-
sion’s own Growth through People proposals,3 
developed to form a consensus across work 
and education, we have focused on creating 
the long-term conditions for improvement. 
Central government certainly has an important 
role to play in helping to create these condi-
tions, but business needs to find the ambition 
to act, the workforce needs to take the oppor-
tunities which are created, and the education 
sector will need to make changes too.
This paper is an overview; it seeks to give a 
flavour of the challenges and their variation 
across the UK’s industries and local areas. It 
offers a starting point for further discussions 
and explorations, which will need to continue 
if we are to see lasting improvements in our 
economic prospects through the skills and 
talents of the UK workforce.
3 UKCES (2014a).
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Unemployment is falling fast, nearing pre-re-
cession levels, and the economy has now had 
eight successive quarters of output growth. The 
economy is once again producing more goods 
and services and employing more people this 
year than it has before.
For a while yet, the recession of 2008-09 will 
remain the critical context for the UK economy. 
Its repercussions are still felt in businesses 
and careers in all parts of the country. After 
more than 15 years of sustained expansion 
with stable employment and high employment, 
we saw our sharpest recorded contraction in 
output on record (Figure 1).
A collision of banking crises, global recession 
and a sequence of shocks met with struc-
tural weakness. Our close proximity with the 
Eurozone then contributed to a recovery 
slower and longer than experience had 
suggested.
If the toughest times are over, there’s plenty 
of pressure still on in the years ahead. Growth 
is back, but has been driven by increasing 
inputs – particularly people at work – rather 
than improved productivity. Pay is only now 
beginning to rise after declining for many years, 
while there remains work to do to put the 
public finances back on a sustainable footing.
A growing economy
Headlines
  The UK economy has now had eight consecutive quarters of economic growth.
  Unemployment is now approaching pre-recession levels.
  Wages remain flat in real terms, after a long period of gradual decline.
  The fall and stagnation in wages mirrors the pattern of productivity; the two are linked.
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Source: ONS QNA series YBEZ. Shaded bands indicate periods of recession.
Figure 1 Quarterly real GDP growth since 1976
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Resurgent employment
The recession saw a severe loss of output, 
and along with it a sharp fall in employment. 
But compared to past recessions, the fall in 
employment was more moderate than we 
had cause to expect, given the depth of the 
recession.
Indeed, while output contracted less and 
bounced back more quickly in the early 1980s 
and early 1990s, in both cases employment did 
not recover for some years afterwards. Unem-
ployment in the early 1980s peaked at 12 per 
cent; in the early 1990s it hit 10.8 per cent; this 
time around, it reached 8.6 per cent.
That still meant some 2.5 million people looking 
for, and failing to find, work. But since growth 
returned, the fall in unemployment has been 
impressively rapid. Recently falling to 5.7 per 
cent, unemployment is beginning to approach 
levels typical of the pre-recession period.
Indeed, the fall in unemployment has been 
almost as fast as the rise had been when the 
recession started. And the improvement is 
driven by economic growth: in contrast to some 
other advanced economies, falling unemploy-
ment does not reflect a withdrawal from the 
labour market. In fact, economic inactivity at 
22.3 per cent is only 0.6 per cent above the 
record low level last seen in 1990.
Another way of seeing the effect of growth is 
through employers’ demand for more labour. 
After many years of languishing at recession 
levels, vacancies are back to the rates seen 
before the recession. The labour market is 
close to returning to its previous efficiency at 
getting people into work (Figure 2).4
4 Figure 2 shows the Beveridge curve, which plots the un-
employment rate against the vacancy rate (no. of vacancies 
as a proportion of employment plus vacancies). The curve 
indicates the labour market’s matching efficiency: move-
ment out from the origin indicates more vacancies are 
needed to sustain a given level of unemployment.
The global economy
In its latest report, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2014) finds that “an uneven global 
recovery continues”. After a significant im-
provement in many advanced economies in 
2013, the first half of 2014 saw an unanticipat-
ed slowdown in improvement. In the Eurozone 
especially, growth has slowed, leading to more 
aggressive monetary policy early in 2015.
Through this period, growth in the UK economy 
has remained strong, and has begun to see 
business investment increase alongside 
household spending. While domestically-driven 
growth is welcome, continued problems in the 
global economy could limit the opportunity to 
expand further through increased trade.
In most advanced economies, recent falls in 
the oil price will offer a substantial boost to 
household and business finances through 
2015. But there remain downside risks: height-
ened geopolitical tension, fears of further tur-
bulence in the Eurozone, and worries about 
growth slowing in the emerging economies. 
The IMF also raises concerns that financial 
markets are underpricing risk, with the 
potential to misguide investment decisions.
The situation in emerging economies is of 
increased interest for the UK given their now 
much-larger profile within the global economy. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China between them 
account for nearly 30 per cent of the world’s 
economic output. But context is important: 
they also have more than 40 per cent of the 
world’s population.
Emerging economies provide new sources of 
competition, but they are some distance away 
from rivalling the advanced economies. With 
ground to make up in economic development, 
they have much lower productivity and are 
prone to greater volatility. They also, critical-
ly, offer greater opportunities for advanced 
economies: as they continue to grow and 
develop, they demand more of the advanced, 
knowledge-intensive products and services 
which countries like the UK are well-positioned 
to deliver.
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Local recessions and recoveries
The consequences of recession were felt in all 
parts of the UK economy. As Figure 3 on page 
16 demonstrates, most parts of the country 
were hit hard with levels of output and employ-
ment lower in 2012 than in 2004 – four years 
after the recession, compared with four years 
before.
The distribution of these changes is important. 
Those areas already characterised by lower 
levels of output and employment were 
among the hardest hit – with major Midland 
and northern urban areas hard hit. Some of 
the largest metropolitan areas especially so: 
Greater Manchester, Greater Birmingham and 
Liverpool all saw a sharp fall in output and em-
ployment between 2004 and 2012.
Yet among those areas scoring highly in 2004 
for output and employment, the effects were 
more muted. In this way we see that just as 
growth before the recession was character-
ised by a significant geographic difference, the 
recession and initial recovery seem to have re-
inforced those differences.
The most important contrast is in London 
– the largest metropolitan area, and yet the 
one which saw increases in employment and 
relative output from 2004 to 2012. London was 
already way out in front of the other areas for 
output. Recession compounded that difference, 
with the capital suffering less and recovering 
more quickly.
The difference in London’s position is stark as 
well; while similar in employment, it is not just 
more productive than the other metropolitan 
areas, but all areas. And one factor in this is 
that London has a much deeper supply of 
high-skilled workers: 58 per cent of the capital’s 
working age population has an NVQ level 4 
qualification or higher, compared to 41 per 
cent for the whole of the UK.
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Figure 2 UK Beveridge curve, 2001-2014
Source: ONS LMS series LF2G, LF2I, AP2Y, May 2001-November 2014. Arrows added for emphasis only.
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Figure 3 Employment rates and GVA per head, DAs and English LEPs 2004-2012
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The decline in wages
Growth has returned, and employment is high 
and rising. Pay is a very different story. Starting 
in the recession, pay has seen a sustained 
decline over many years. The latest indications 
are that real terms pay is now beginning to 
grow once more, helped in large part by the fall 
in inflation.
This prolonged decline is a departure from 
recent historic experience. In the postwar era, 
real pay has risen in most years, with only oc-
casional, short-lived declines (Figure 4). In the 
initial recession, one part of the explanation 
was perhaps simple: the smaller rise in unem-
ployment reflected increased wage flexibility, as 
people accepted a real fall in pay to maintain 
their employment. But as unemployment 
returns towards pre-recession levels, that ex-
planation hardly seems so clear-cut, and other 
factors must be at work.
One factor can’t be avoided: wages have fallen 
in large part because productivity has fallen. 
Figure 5 shows productivity (output per hour 
worked) against two measures of weekly pay. 
The first measure, which falls fastest, far more 
quickly than productivity, is real weekly pay as 
we typically understand it: pay in terms of the 
retail prices and housing costs we have to pay. 
As we all know, many of those costs increased 
sharply through some of the years of recession 
and recovery, eroding the purchasing power of 
wages back to levels seen in 2004.
The second measure is the ‘product wage’. This 
is pay in terms of the prices UK businesses can 
sell their goods and services at – to foreign 
customers as well as domestic consumers. 
These terms reflect the cost of wages to 
employers, and it tracks much more closely to 
stagnant productivity.5
5 Broadbent (2014).
Source: ONS (2014a) for wages and RPI data. AWE KAC9 data added to bring up-to-date; RPI data replaced 
with RPIJ data where available.
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In terms of living standards, the result is the 
same: overall, wages buy little more in the 
shops than they did in 2004, and a week’s pay 
buys a little less productivity than it did before 
the recession. Although real pay is now increas-
ing, there is a significant distance to catch up.
Understanding the problem this way is 
important: it confirms that there remains a 
clear link between employee earnings and 
workplace productivity.6 That being the case, 
if we want to improve the prospects for pay 
growth, then we will have to do something 
about prospects for productivity growth.
6 Median pay stagnated before the recession, in part 
reflecting distributional changes. Pessoa and Van Reenen 
(2013). See also the discussion in Cribb and Joyce (2015).
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Figure 5 Productivity and real weekly pay since 2004
Source: ONS LMS LZVB, AWE KAB9, QNA CGBV, MM23 KVR8. RPIJ prices are consumer prices including 
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As the economy grows and the labour market 
recovers, there is plenty of discussion of 
whether the new jobs are of the right quality 
as well as the right quantity. The worry is that 
new growth is creating plenty of new jobs, 
but they’re of low quality: making little use of 
skills, offering few opportunities, and providing 
limited prospects.
As we shall see, this is not an accurate charac-
terisation. Even through recession, the UK has 
continued on its path to providing relatively 
more work in high-skilled jobs. During the last 
decade, the UK has added more high-skilled 
jobs than any other EU member state.
That said, there is also growth in low-skilled 
jobs, especially in service-intensive areas. 
There are justified concerns that these jobs 
offer limited prospects for those taking them. 
But it is also true that these jobs have offered 
important opportunities to stay connected to 
the labour market through recession, particu-
larly important given the potential for ‘scarring’ 
from unemployment.
As for the form of employment, there are 
certainly more people in part-time, temporary 
and self-employment. But these need to be 
handled carefully: while for many they might 
well be ‘bad jobs’, taken for lack of any other 
options, for others they reflect positive choices 
that better suit their lifestyles and ambitions.
The most important questions are often less 
about new jobs than the people who do or do 
not get them. Young people have seen long 
term falls in employment levels, and were hit 
hard by recession. Besides youth, gender, 
ethnicity and disability all can bring potential 
disadvantages in the labour market, be it in the 
experience of unemployment or limited oppor-
tunity to progress.
Where are the new jobs coming from?
Over the last two decades, the trend in the 
labour market has been in favour of more high-
skilled jobs. As Figure 6 on page 20 shows, 
the number of high-skilled jobs has seen barely 
interrupted growth since the early 1990s. Even 
the depths of the 2008-9 recession did not 
intrude on that trend.
As a consequence, as new high-skilled jobs 
were created during recession as well as since 
in recovery, they have dominated the increase 
in employment. From the first quarter of 2008 
to the third quarter of 2014, we have seen the 
following net changes in four broad occupa-
tional groups:
  1.3m more high-skilled jobs
  0.5m fewer middle-skilled jobs
  0.3m more service-intensive jobs
  0.2m fewer labour-intensive jobs7
7 Nomis, ONS APS, 08Q1 to 14Q3, rounded to nearest 
0.1m.
New jobs
Headlines
  Most employment growth since the recession has been in high-skilled roles.
  There is more part-time, temporary and self-employed work, with upsides and downsides.
  Pay growth has been weak overall, but held up in part by the shift toward high-skilled roles.
  Adverse effects are concentrated on those at the margins of the labour market.
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While the growth in high-skilled jobs has been 
consistent, the return to growth in 2013 has 
changed the recent picture. A tightening labour 
market is increasingly finding work for those 
unable to take high-skilled work, with increases 
in all broad occupational groups; although 
the increases remain largest in high-skilled 
(420,000) roles.8
While the current across-the-board growth 
is welcome, the effects of recession have 
followed closely the long term trend towards 
an ‘hourglass’ labour market. We have seen 
pronounced high-skill and service-intensive 
jobs growth and middle-skill decline since the 
1980s; the recession magnified its effects.
8 Nomis, APS, 13Q3 to 14Q3, rounded to nearest 10,000. 
Middle-skilled roles increased by 130,000..
Figure 7 looks at employment growth by each 
occupational group up to and through the 
recession and tells the story clearly: growth 
in high-skilled jobs was barely dented by 
recession, and then saw robust growth early in 
the recovery period.
Service-intensive jobs growth, while more 
volatile, also returned strongly at the end of 
recession. But labour-intensive and middle-skill 
jobs saw very sharp falls – around 5 and 10 per 
cent respectively – from their pre-recession 
levels.
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Figure 6 Cumulative change in employment since 1992, by broad occupational group
Source: UKCES analysis of Labour Force Survey. The gap is a break in occupational coding in 2001.
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Where the work is (and isn’t)
The dominance of high-skill and service-in-
tensive jobs growth shows through on closer 
detail as well. In terms of occupations, caring 
assistants (144,000), service sector managers 
(92,000), and associate professionals in 
business and finance (91,000) have made the 
largest contributions to expanded employment 
since 2011.9
There are important gender differences here. 
For men, the largest job creators are IT and 
telecoms professional roles (72,000) and 
for women, caring assistants (108,000). The 
sharpest losses in employment have come in 
administrative roles, especially within govern-
ment (61,000) and elementary sales occupa-
tions (27,000). 
9 All figures are from ONS Labour Market Statistics, EMP16 
from August 2011 and EMP04 from August 2014, and 
relate to the change in total jobs by SOC Minor Group.
The difference between these last two is in-
structive: while the recession saw some decline 
in low-skill roles – even in a service-intensive 
setting such as sales – it has not been sufficient 
to offset the ‘hourglass’ decline in middle-skill 
administrative work.
At this more detailed level, the recent period’s 
recovery in middle-skill work shows up: food 
preparation, agricultural and finance ad-
ministration roles feature in the top 20 job 
creators from 2011 to 2014 (adding 157,000 
jobs together). But overall, of those top 20 job 
creating occupations, 13 are high-skilled roles 
which between them have added 723,000 jobs 
since 2011.
High-skill jobs growth
Past analysis has highlighted the small gap in 
the UK between the demand for high-skilled 
workers, and the supply of tertiary-educated 
workers, especially when compared with other 
advanced economies.10 That gap is now smaller 
(Figure 8).11
As the data on high-skill job growth show, the 
lack of excess demand up to 2006 has not 
prevented a large growth since then. In fact, 
the UK has moved to have one of the highest 
combined levels of high-skilled jobs and tertia-
ry-educated workers.
From 2006 to 2013, the UK added 2.2 million 
high-skilled jobs out of a total of 5.1 million 
added across the European Union, more than 
any other member state. That achievement 
also aligns with recent evidence, which suggest 
that the labour market has been able to absorb 
the large expansion in the graduate work-
force.12 
10 UKCES (2009).
11 The gap is seen by the distance from the diagonal line.
12 Green and Henseke (2014).
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Figure 7 Employment growth, 2004-2014
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Flexible employment
While job growth may have concentrated in 
high-skilled roles, falling real-terms pay and 
stories about increasingly casual employ-
ment mean that worries remain. But here it’s 
important to put such developments in the 
right context. Increased flexibility is a common 
feature of recessions and therefore perhaps 
not unexpected. We also need to recognise 
with significant developments in the world of 
work which mean that the growth in such forms 
of working are not always negative and often 
reflect positive lifestyle choices.
It’s certainly true that we’ve seen a rapid 
increase in part-time work since the recession. 
Indeed, part-time employment has grown con-
sistently, while full-time employment has only 
just recovered the losses of recession (Figure 
9). The growth in part-time work has magnified 
a long-term shift, driven in part by changing 
lifestyles.
The recession and its aftermath also saw a 
rapid increase in the share of temporary and 
part-time work taken for lack of permanent 
or full-time alternatives. Those increases have 
tailed off more recently, but both ‘involuntary’ 
forms of work remain much more prevalent 
than they were in 2007 (Figure 10). The longer 
time series in the chart shows the similar 
experience after the recession of the early 
1990s – which diminished as the labour market 
tightened.
Even here we should be conscious of the 
benefits as well as the drawbacks: even 
unwanted part-time work is better for many 
people than unemployment.13 But that said, an 
effective labour market should match people to 
the hours they want, and typically most people 
prefer permanent employment. Increased 
temporary employment is therefore naturally a 
cause for concern; all the more so when a large 
share of it isn’t wanted.
13 Bell and Blanchflower (2014) find that hours-con-
strained part-time work results in a significant loss of 
100
105
110
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t l
ev
el
 (0
8Q
1=
10
0)
Full time Part time
0
10
20
30
40
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
%
 o
f a
ll 
PT
/t
em
p 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
Invol. PT Invol. Temp
Source: ONS LMS YCBE and YCBH. Source: ONS LMS YCCF, YCBZ, YCCU, YCCX.
Figure 9 Full-time and part-time work Figure 10 Involuntary part-time/temp jobs
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It remains the case that the UK labour market 
is not characterised by particularly high levels 
of temporary employment or involuntary 
part-time work when compared with other 
European economies (Figure 11). At the same 
time, any increase in the rate of unwanted 
part-time work means not only lower incomes 
for those affected, but underutilised labour and 
skills.
The fact that unwanted part-time work 
remains elevated means that although the 
headline employment rate has now returned 
to pre-recession levels, looking at a ‘fully 
employed’ rate – excluding those working 
below their desired hours – suggests that 
there is still some distance to travel (Figure 
12). It seems likely that as the labour market 
continues to tighten, such underemployment 
will return to its previous levels – but it remains 
worthy of continued attention.
well-being, but less than so than unemployment.
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Figure 11 Shares of temporary and involuntary part-time work, by country, 2013
Source: stats.oecd.org, using TEMP_I and INVPT_I, all age, male and female, 2013, shares of employment. 
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Figure 12 ‘Fully employed’ employment rate
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Much of this is down to demographic change, 
with a doubling of self-employed over-65s in 
five years. Also, the large majority of self-em-
ployed workers still do prefer their status, 
and this is relatively unchanged through the 
recession and recovery – perhaps reflecting 
the fact that more have chosen to stay with 
self-employment for longer.15
Whether the sharp fall in self-employment 
incomes reflects a lasting change, or the 
greater volatility in returns from self-employ-
ment remains to be seen. Once again, the 
trend – which goes back many years before the 
last recession (Figure 13) – remains worthy of 
continued attention, as does the composition 
of self-employment.
15 ONS (2014a).
The rise of self-employment
A striking development since recession has 
been in the growth of self-employment; indeed, 
nearly 15 per cent of those employed are now 
working for themselves (Figure 13).
There is a positive interpretation of the change: 
a larger independent workforce benefiting from 
the flexibility of being their own boss. But, es-
pecially given that the increase has happened 
alongside the recession, it may be that many 
are becoming self-employed to avoid unem-
ployment while still lacking meaningful work.
Recent analysis suggests we shouldn’t be so 
quick to see the increase as a form of hidden 
underemployment.14 There has been a large 
increase in self-employment, and sharp falls (22 
per cent) in associated incomes. But self-em-
ployment has increased because fewer people 
have flowed out (Figure 14), not because of an 
influx of otherwise-unemployed people.
14 ONS (2014b).
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Pay pressures and inequalities
In aggregate, there is a positive picture of the 
labour market: over a million more high-skilled 
jobs, and more recently, growth at all levels. 
Employment terms may have become less 
attractive, but while some of it is involuntary, 
part of it reflects positive choices to work fewer 
hours or more flexibly.
If we have more high-skilled jobs, surely that 
should mean on average increased pay? In fact, 
the addition of more high-skilled employment 
does seem to have boosted pay growth relative 
to what it would’ve been.
Figure 15 shows the results of a decomposition 
analysis on pay change, and shows that the 
shift towards higher-skilled work (the ‘compo-
sitional effect’) has continued to push earnings 
at the same rate as it did before the recession. 
The difference is in the ‘underlying change’, 
which turned negative in recession and has 
remained so since.16
16 Cribb and Joyce (2015). See also Gardiner and Whittaker 
But if the general labour market picture is 
positive, the specific experience of certain 
workers is often more troubled. The adverse 
effects of recession, and the struggles of 
recovery, have been concentrated on those at 
the margins of the labour market.
Perhaps the clearest sense of just how many 
are at the margins come from analysis of the 
low-paid. Some 22 per cent of employees – 5.2 
million in 2013 – earn less than two-thirds of 
hourly median pay, a level stable since the early 
1990s; in 1975 it was 15 per cent.17 Of those, 
while the majority (64 per cent) will move out of 
low pay for a time, just one in four (25 per cent) 
will find a lasting escape.18
(2014), who highlight the recent resurgence in middle- and 
lower-skill employment and suggest that the compositional 
effect may recently have reversed a little.
17 Corlett and Whittaker (2014).
18 D’Arcy and Hurrell (2014).
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Figure 15 Decomposing changes in mean real hourly wages
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These employees are more likely to have no 
qualifications and limited skills, and more likely 
to find themselves in a low-end job, with less 
access to training; their opportunity to progress 
is limited. Indeed, the clustering of such factors 
can hit most those at the margins of the labour 
market and risks inhibiting progression.
Those experiencing unemployment are an 
obvious case here. And whereas the prospects 
of returning to work have been far better than 
in the previous two recessions, the potential for 
‘scarring’ is still high, affecting both their em-
ployability and their well-being.19 Other workers 
find themselves closer to the margins of the 
labour market simply by virtue of their gender, 
ethnicity or disability.
19 Bell and Blanchflower (2010).
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Figure 16 Employment rates, by gender
Flexible contracts
The recession and prolonged recovery led 
to an increase in employment on temporary 
terms, including so-called ‘zero hours’ 
contracts. Concerns arise where those in need 
of regular, secure employment can only find 
work on temporary or casual terms. There are 
certainly signs that some have experienced 
such disadvantage in recent years.
There are advantages and disadvantages 
in flexible contracts. Temporary and casual 
employment allows flexibility for employers, 
supporting greater risk-taking, and many 
employees also benefit from being able to 
work with limited commitment.
Context is important. While they are often used 
for service-intensive roles, flexible contracts 
are also found in middle- and high-skill roles. 
For ‘knowledge workers’ they are particularly 
common, and support their mobility between 
employers.1 There remains a lot of uncertainty 
about the level of usage; it certainly seems to 
have increased, but unclear definitions have 
made measurement difficult.2
There are issues. People employed on zero 
hours contracts are disproportionately likely to 
be women, or young (16 to 24) or older (65 and 
over) age groups. They are also more likely to 
be in full-time education; whether that reflects 
a preference for flexibility is unclear.
Around half of part-time workers on these 
contracts would work more hours, and similar 
numbers report finding it difficult to budget 
month-to-month. Second, flexibility as an 
imposition is heavily concentrated among 
young people. Where a third of all workers 
on temporary or zero hours contracts took 
them for want of permanent work, around 
half of 16-24 year olds did so. Third, where 
three-quarters of permanent employees 
receiving training had it paid for by their 
employer, less than 60 per cent of those on 
temporary or zero hour contracts did so.
1 UKCES (2014c).
2 ONS (2014c).
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This high level review risks overlooking the 
experiences of different groups in society. In-
equality is an ill in its own right, and a check on 
growth as we fail to maximise the talent of all 
our people.
Whilst inequality is associated with a number of 
identities like gender, ethnicity and disability,1 
it is a simplification to discuss these as neat 
standalone categories. The intersectionality of 
identities, and differences between and within 
groups, are more complex than this overview 
can capture. These themes will be explored in a 
future paper from UKCES. 
Gender
Gender inequalities remain within the labour 
market, with the UK ranked 26th in the world 
for gender inequality in a recent analysis.2 
Women match or outperform men in educa-
tional attainment and this trend will continue 
with 49 per cent of women predicted to hold a 
degree-level qualification by 2020 (compared to 
44 per cent for men).3
But when it comes to employment we do 
not “reap the returns from this investment”.4 
Women’s participation rates are lower and they 
are less likely to be senior officials or managers. 
The gender pay gap at 9.4 per cent, whilst down 
from 17.4 per cent in 1997, remains sizeable.5 
This in part relates to greater levels of part time 
employment (38.4 per cent as against 11.7 per 
cent) and hours per week spent in unpaid work 
(258 as against 141).6 That all said, in recovery 
from the recent recession, the female employ-
ment rate has returned to pre-recession levels, 
while the male rate has some distance to travel 
(Figure 16).
1 Wider inequalities (of for example religion and sexuality) 
are important but not explored here. Age is a key factor, 
and challenges facing our young people are explored 
throughout this report.
2 WEF (2014).
3 UKCES research by Bosworth (2014).
4 WEF (2014).
5 ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2014.
6 WEF (2014)
Ethnicity
Educational differences on the basis of ethnicity 
are complex: young people from minority ethnic 
groups are more likely to go to FE College than 
sixth form and have lower take-up of appren-
ticeships and vocational qualifications.7 They 
are more likely to participate in HE8 but obtain 
lower class degrees. There are concerns about 
the educational performance of white men from 
lower socio-economic groups.9
There is an 11.8 per cent rate gap in em-
ployment and 5.9 per cent in unemployment 
between ethnic minority groups and the wider 
working age population.10 In work, there are 
important differences in pay, skills-utilisation, 
part time work, self-employment, retention and 
progression. The reasons are complex and go 
beyond overt discrimination. The informality of 
many workplaces, for example with word-of-
mouth recruitment, disadvantage ethnic minori-
ties, as most people network with those from 
the same ethnic background.11
Disability
Working age people with a disability are more 
likely than non-disabled people to have no qual-
ifications and half as likely to hold a degree.12 
They are more likely to be unemployed (12 
per cent compared with 8 per cent) and to 
be unemployed for over a year (47 per cent 
compared with 31 per cent).13 The employment 
rate gap has reduced by 10 percentage points 
in the last 14 years, but remains sizeable at 30.1 
percentage points: equivalent to over 2 million 
people. Disabled people are more likely to be 
in part-time and low-skilled work and less likely 
to hold managerial or professional roles: conse-
quently they earn less.14 
7 Barnard and Turner (2011).
8 The exception here is among Black Caribbean men.
9 Barnard and Turner (2011).
10 DWP (2014).
11 Barnard and Turner (2011).
12 DWP and Office for Disability Issues (2014).
13 EHRC (2013).
14 DWP and Office for Disability Issues (2014).
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Young people
Young people, as so often, have faced a par-
ticularly tough time in recession. On the latest 
data, the youth unemployment rate remains at 
nearly three and a half times times the rate for 
the ‘prime age’ workforce.20
These figures reflect the benefits of recovery; 
the unemployment situation is now improving 
for young people, although it still has some 
distance to travel (Figure 17). Most recently, 
we have finally begun to see genuine progress 
made in reducing the very high number of 
young people stuck in long-term unemploy-
ment (Figure 19 and Figure 20 on page 31).
20 ONS Labour Market Statistics, November 2014. Data 
covers Jul-Sep 2014. ‘Youth’ is 16-24, ‘rest of workforce’ is 
25-64.
While the falls in youth unemployment are 
great news, there are signs of a permanent 
change in the labour market for young people. 
The 16-24 employment rate fell more sharply 
than for other age groups; but it had already 
been in decline since the early 2000s (Figure 
18). Even though there has been some im-
provement with the overall recovery, employ-
ment of young people remains far below its 
pre-recession level, and even further below the 
levels of a decade ago.
As the labour market recovers, the trend of 
fewer employers recruiting young people 
seems to have clearly reversed,21 but the gap 
between pre-recession and current employ-
ment levels for young people remains large. 
21 UKCES research by Shury et al. (2014). 
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Figure 17 Unemployment rates, by age Figure 18 Employment rates, by age
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Exposure to the world of work is critical for 
young people to get a start in their careers. For 
employers, work experience is a critical factors 
in recruitment decisions. But is there sufficient 
opportunity for young people to gain that work 
experience? 
Work experience as a recruitment tool
66 per cent of employers in our recent 
Employer Perspectives Survey said work expe-
rience was the most critical factor they looked 
for in job candidates.1 11 per cent also reported 
actively having used work experience place-
ments to help with recruitment, whilst almost a 
third of those who had offered a placement (31 
per cent) reported that a work placement had 
resulted in them offering someone a permanent 
or long-term role.
Employer views of education leavers 
Young people looking for their first job on 
leaving education are in a particularly tricky 
situation. There has been a substantial decline 
in ‘earning and learning’, so that many are 
leaving without having had a job.2 
The picture is not all negative. Of the 31 per 
cent of employers who had taken on an individ-
ual straight from education in the last 2-3 years, 
the majority found them to be well prepared 
for work. But the minority that had found them 
poorly prepared most commonly reported that 
they lacked experience of the working world.
Employers and their work experience offer
Are employers offering the work placements 
required to enable individuals to get the experi-
ence they need? Our evidence shows that they 
aren’t. Despite two-thirds of employers finding 
work experience critical or significant, only 38 
per cent reported having had individuals on 
work experience placements in the previous 12 
months.
1 UKCES research by Shury et al. (2014). All statistics cited 
here are from this source.
2 UKCES (2014b).
The Construction sector (21 per cent), Manufac-
turing (26 per cent) and the Primary and Utilities 
sector (27 per cent) were lowest, with public 
and voluntary sector institutions more likely to 
offer work placements than their private sector 
counterparts . Despite wanting to employ indi-
viduals with work experience, a substantial pro-
portion of employers are not providing the tools 
for individuals to gain this experience.
This catch-22 is explained in part by barriers 
such as time and resource constraints , and 
also when looking at the motivations of those 
that had offered work experience. Seven in 
ten of the employers who offered work expe-
rience reported that they did so for altruistic 
reasons, rather than for their own corporate 
benefit, which was only mentioned by 38 per 
cent. Despite altruistic motivations declining 
as a reason since 2012, and corporate benefit 
seeing a small rise, some employers are not 
yet convinced of the benefit to them of offering 
work experience . 
Collaborating to inspire students
As well as work placements, employers are also 
engaging with students in a variety of other 
ways: organising site visits; providing mentoring 
support; conducting mock interviews; helping to 
design coursework and sponsoring enterprise 
competitions. Just under one-fifth (18 per cent) 
had engaged in at least one of these activi-
ties over the previous year . Of them, the vast 
majority reported that they did not experience 
difficulties and barriers in doing so. Where a 
small minority did, issues encountered included: 
education institutions having little interest in 
engaging them; poor quality of candidates and, 
more prevalent for universities than schools or 
colleges, problems identifying the right person 
to engage with inside the institution. Overall 
this presents a positive picture: employers who 
are collaborating with education institutions do 
not on the whole find it difficult. However, the 
majority of employers are yet to engage in this 
way. 
Work experience: new evidence from the Employer Perspectives Survey 2014
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We know that the opportunity for work expe-
rience has become rarer – the UK has been 
a marked decline in ‘earning while learning’, 
not seen elsewhere in the EU.22 But given 
the evidence on falling pay for young people 
relative to other workers,23 alongside the fall in 
their employment, the recession seems to have 
marked a shift in favour of experience.
22 UKCES (2014b).
23 Comparing ONS ASHE 2008 and 2014 median hourly 
gross pay, 22-29 year olds saw a 3.9 per cent increase. 
All age pay increased by 9.3 per cent. Consumer prices 
increased by 18 per cent.
Employers are clear that experience matters; 
but we know that too few opportunities are 
available to gain meaningful work experience 
(see box on previous page). The risk is that 
some young people become caught in a trap, 
where they can’t progress for want of experi-
ence; and their lack of progress means they 
don’t gain that experience.
0
5
10
15
20
25
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Ra
te
 b
y d
ur
at
io
n,
 1
6−
24
<6 mths 6−12 mths >12 mths
0
5
10
15
20
25
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Ra
te
 b
y d
ur
at
io
n,
 2
5−
49
<6 mths 6−12 mths >12 mths
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics.
Figure 20 Unemployment duration, 25-49sFigure 19 Unemployment duration, 16-24s
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics.
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Rapid growth over 2013 and 2014 is welcome, 
and looks set to continue. But if the 2008-9 
recession has a lesson, it’s that we can take 
little for granted about our economic future. 
For living standards to rise once again on a 
sustainable basis, we must be able to achieve 
lasting improvements in our capacity to deliver 
products and services which customers around 
the world value.
Since the recession, we have suffered a signif-
icant setback in productivity growth. That’s a 
new development: in the previous two reces-
sions, productivity continued to grow, despite 
the tough economic times.
This time, after an initial fall, it has stagnated, 
leading to a 14 per cent decline relative to 
the pre-recession trend (Figure 21).24 Such a 
decline represents a substantial loss in the 
potential for improved living standards, as well 
as having important consequences for the 
public finances.
Internationally, while some other advanced 
economies have experienced a productivity 
slowdown, the depth of the UK’s difficulties has 
eroded much of the progress made in the last 
few decades in improving our relative produc-
tivity (Figure 22).
24 Pre-recession trend calculated at 2.1 per cent per an-
num, from labour productivity 1979-2008, EU-KLEMS.
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Figure 21 Productivity in 3 recessions Figure 22 Relative productivity, 1993-2013
Growth prospects
Headlines
  Since the onset of recession, productivity has fallen 14 per cent behind its long term trend.
  The global economy is shifting, making for intense competition but also new opportunities.
  Skills have been critical for productivity gains, but their use seems to be highly variable.
  Future growth sectors are knowledge- or service-intensive, making the workplace critical.
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There remain good reasons to believe that pro-
ductivity will return to growth,25 but its decline 
and stagnation remains the most striking 
feature of the UK economy.
Our concern here is specific: what role do the 
skills of the workforce have in driving economic 
growth, and what prospects does this suggest 
we have? And in turn, how is it that we might 
improve those prospects?
25 Besley and Van Reenen (2013).
The shifting global economy
After the consequences of recession, the UK 
finds itself behind the front rank of advanced 
economies for productivity and employ-
ment. With relatively high employment by the 
standards of the G7 nations, the UK’s produc-
tivity falls some way behind the US, Germany 
and France (Figure 23).
Yet this is hardly the whole story. Outside of the 
world’s most advanced economies, there are 
large emerging economies improving rapidly 
and playing an increasingly important role in 
shaping the global economy. Already some are 
joining the advanced economies: from 1970 to 
2013, Korean labour productivity went from 17 
per cent to 61 per cent of the UK’s level.
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Figure 23 Productivity and employment, OECD advanced economies, 2013
G
RO
W
TH
 P
RO
SP
EC
TS
34
The largest difference to the world economy 
is being made in the most populous emerging 
economies, especially China and India. Their 
growth is fuelled in part by domestic institu-
tional reform, but also by the rapidly growing 
educated workforces in those countries. China, 
for example, is now estimated as having more 
university students than the United States, and 
producing more scientists and engineers.26
With falling transport and communication 
costs, these new high-skilled workers soon add 
to the competition in high-value markets long 
seen as the preserve of advanced economies. 
UK businesses in some of the most knowl-
edge-intensive industries are facing new and 
sharper competition.
26 Brown et al. (2011).
But it’s wrong to see this as all risk and no 
opportunity; as skilled workers in emerging 
economies prosper, they will create new 
demands. Projections suggest that if growth 
continues as anticipated, Asia will account 
for more than half of the world’s middle class 
by 2020, and account for over 40 per cent of 
global middle class consumption.27
Where the UK can specialise in products and 
services in which it can uniquely add value, 
there remains the prospect of large, sustained 
gains from growth in emerging economies. 
That may be in serving the expanding global 
middle class, but it’s also true that as emerging 
economy commerce expands it will create new 
needs for the sorts of business and profession-
al services in which the UK has a well-known 
comparative advantage.
27 Kharas (2010).
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Figure 24 Contributions to productivity growth, 2000-2013
Source: ONS Multi-factor Productivity (experimental), Estimates to 2013.
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Skills have driven productivity gains
There are many aspects to productivity, ranging 
from infrastructure to regulation and beyond. 
Our concern here is with improving productivity 
at work and that means improving skills and 
putting them to better use in the workplace. 
Skills played an important and sustainable role 
in productivity growth in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Increasing opportunity to participate in higher 
education resulted in a substantial boost to the 
supply of high-skilled workers. That expansion 
in the size of the talent pool has not been 
reversed, making a positive contribution to pro-
ductivity growth in every year, even through the 
recession (Figure 24).
And in fact, the expansion still has some way 
to work through. The UK Commission’s projec-
tions of qualifications supply in 2020 see an 
increase in those qualified to level 4 and above 
(post-secondary, higher education) from 37 to 
47 per cent over this period, with the fastest 
growth in postgraduates (levels 7-8).28
There will be further falls in the numbers 
holding no qualifications (from 9 to 6 per cent). 
Perhaps most interestingly, while the numbers 
with advanced qualifications grow fast, the 
numbers holding intermediate qualifications 
will fall. By 2020, there are expected to be 1 
million fewer people holding level 2 and 3 qual-
ifications.29
However, while the UK is making progress in 
improving qualifications internally, what will 
matter for our economic prospects is the com-
parison with other advanced economies. And 
compared to the 33 other member countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the UK’s achieve-
ments are more mixed.
28 UKCES research by Bosworth (2014).
29 UKCES research by Bosworth (2014).
Skills attainment is classified according to three 
levels: Low skills (Below Upper Secondary), In-
termediate skills (Upper Secondary) and Higher 
skills (Tertiary). The UK performs relatively 
poorly on low skills.  It is currently ranked 19th 
(i.e. there are 18 out of the 33 other countries 
with lower proportions of those with low or no 
qualifications), and below the EU and OECD 
averages.
The UK performs poorly too on intermediate 
skills. While 37 per cent of the adult population 
hold ‘upper secondary’ qualifications, we are 
ranked 24th out of 33 nations. By 2020, with the 
decline in intermediate skills (to 34 per cent), 
we look like slipping to 28th.
But in fairness, that absolute decline in the 
numbers with intermediate skills allows an 
improvement in our strength: high-level skills. 
Already 11th out of 33, the increase from 37 
to 47 per cent of the workforce with tertiary 
education will give us the 7th largest share of 
highly skilled workers (Figure 25).
Workforce skills are polarised
The UK does well in generating highly qualified 
workers, but is much less successful at devel-
oping the skills of the rest of the workforce. 
This is exemplified by the results of the recent 
international Survey of Adult Skills, operating 
across 24 OECD countries.30
The survey assesses the proficiency of the 
workforce in three key skills, covering: literacy, 
numeracy and problem solving in technology 
rich environments. Crucially, these skills are 
measured not by qualifications but by direct 
testing, allowing for a more more robust com-
parison.
30 OECD (2013).
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Figure 25 Qualification shares by international rank, 2020 projections (red dots=current levels)
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Importantly, the survey shows that whilst the 
UK31 performs among the best with its highly 
skilled adults, it has a significant minority of 
people with a very low level proficiency in 
literacy and numeracy. 
Further, the UK performs around the OECD 
average in literacy and problem-solving but sig-
nificantly below the OECD average in numeracy, 
where we came seventeenth out of 24 par-
ticipating countries. Behind the aggregate 
score, around a sixth of British adults score 
at the lowest levels in literacy, and just under 
a quarter in numeracy. Around a third of the 
adult population score at the highest levels in 
problem solving.
The survey’s findings suggest a worrying gap in 
the workforce, between the skills-rich and the 
skills-poor. Such a gap exists in most countries, 
but the survey suggests it is comparatively large 
in the UK. Furthermore, the degree of such 
skills polarisation risks intensifying in future if 
the workplace entrenches them. For example, 
we know that learning creates the habit of 
more learning, and that this in turn influences 
individual career ambitions and the motivation 
to learn in support of them.
Barriers to further gains on skills
These international comparisons do well to 
highlight that employees’ skills are only as good 
as the outlet they find in the workplace: the 
bundle of tasks they perform, the opportuni-
ties they have to learn and develop. For while 
skilled workers are valuable, their contribution 
to productivity depends on their combination 
with the right tools and techniques.32 
31 Note that only England and Northern Ireland participat-
ed in the survey.
32 Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Bresnahan et al. 
(2002).
While labour quality has consisently added to 
our productivity this past two decades, it was 
because it was successfully applied at work. If 
our productivity is set back, we need to think 
about how we adapt the application of skills to 
perform in a changed world economy.
The same pattern is reflected in the strong 
association between those leaving education 
with no qualifications, those in low skilled work 
and those with low levels of skill proficiency. 
Parental education adds a further influence, 
which means these habits may be long 
standing and harder to reform.
In addition, the talent pool of the highly skilled 
looks set to shrink in the future, as unlike most 
other countries, the level of skills proficien-
cy is not advancing amongst younger adults 
entering the labour market compared to older 
age groups (between 55 and 65).
With such developments it therefore seems, 
despite the UK’s current advantage in high 
skills, our position risks being diminished by im-
provements in other countries, and problems 
of developing and applying the best skills in the 
labour market in the UK. Solutions to such a 
complex set of problems will need to cut across 
many of our more established education and 
workplace boundaries.
Sectors, skills and productivity
Those caveats aside, why is the increasingly- 
qualified workforce no longer resulting in 
improved productivity? The sharp drop in Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) tells an important part 
of the story (Figure 24).33 TFP is that black box 
of factors driving performance beyond mea-
surable inputs. Most of all, it gives us a sense of 
how effective we are at turning those inputs – 
labour, capital, skills – into output.
33 The ONS data in Figure 24 are designated ‘Multi Factor 
Productivity’, but the meaning is the same. See ONS (2015).
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Figure 26 Output per hour, by sector, since 2001
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Its sharp decline as recession hit tells us that 
our immediate problems are less the quantity 
of skills available than their application. Some 
of that will be across the labour market, but 
much of it will be in the workplace – how well 
people are matched to jobs, how well they are 
managed in those jobs, how well they are com-
plemented by tools and technologies.
Looking at productivity at the sector level 
(Figure 26), what’s striking is the way that the 
slowdown has hit in almost every sector. Yet 
the widespread pattern of poor performance 
defies a simple explanation. A recent analysis 
attributes the net loss in individual sector pro-
ductivity to a varying set of factors including 
changing regulation; changing business models, 
and labour retention to maintain operating 
scale amidst falling demand.34
34 McCafferty (2013).
Innovation and investment
The shared factor across sectors is the 
response of the workplace to economic shocks. 
It’s at the workplace level that decisions are 
made about investing in and making use of 
skills, and how to match them with complemen-
tary investments in new capital and improved 
business process. It’s these combinations of 
investment and innovation which drive knowl-
edge-intensive businesses, especially in service 
sectors. And looking ahead, it’s these sorts of 
businesses which will make up an increasing 
share of employment (Figure 27).
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Still other service sectors are responding both 
to overall growth and to changes within the UK. 
Health and social work is projected to be one 
of the largest sector job creators for this new 
decade, its expansion driven by demands rising 
because of new possibilities and shifting demo-
graphics. It’s in these sectors where we need 
most of all to see improved productivity – and 
again it will depend on innovation matched with 
investments in skills and new technology.
Innovation in these sectors is often much less 
visible than the great technological break-
throughs we associate with manufacturing. But 
in many ways, it is more pervasive: constant 
reworking of business processes, refinement 
of skills, and evolving job designs all come into 
play.
Although businesses generally did not cut back 
on training investment as much as feared, the 
higher ‘floor’ seems to have been a response 
to regulation rather than reflecting strong 
commitment. In fact, many workplaces sought 
to cut training costs in other ways – providing 
training in-house and continuing a long-term 
decline in training time.35 
In recession, many businesses sought to 
protect their workplace by hoarding skilled 
labour, contributing to declining productivity.36 
Those that did so were less likely to train their 
workforce.37 Although business investment in 
physical capital has recently begun to recover, 
there are few signs yet of a similar growth in in-
vestment in skills and human capital, which has 
been in long-term decline.
35 UKCES research by Felstead et al. (2013).
36 Barnett et al. (2014a, 2014b).
37 Crawford et al. (2013).
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While we need action to improve skills at the 
low and middle end of the workforce, the UK 
has a large highly-skilled workforce. Yet these 
skills are only valuable to the extent that they 
can be put to use in the workplace. Even when 
matched with the very best of technology, if 
skilled workers aren’t managed and organised 
effectively, then their contribution to economic 
growth will be limited.
The evidence is that the UK has a variable 
business population, with a fair share of work-
places managed at world-class levels, but also a 
long tail of businesses with weak management. 
Unfortunately, there are signs that in the past 
decade, expansion hasn’t always been led by 
our best businesses.
As our economy becomes more knowledge- 
and service-intensive, managing and getting 
the most out of employees and their skills 
becomes ever more important. Yet again, there 
are few signs to suggest more than a minority 
of businesses are adopting ‘high performance 
working’ to develop a workplace culture which 
nurtures and harnesses talent.
Instead, too many businesses seem in a ‘low 
skill equilibrium’, limiting their ambitions by 
organising work around a low level of skill. 
These businesses use the minimum necessary 
skill from their employees, rather than seeking 
to fully utilise their talents, or develop them 
further, to drive the business forward.
World class and a long tail
If growth depends on the combination of skills 
with organisation and technology, then the 
way that the workplace is managed becomes 
a critical factor in our long-term economic 
prospects.
Some workplaces contribute much more to 
growth than others. Large and persistent pro-
ductivity differences exist, even within narrowly 
defined industry sectors. Evidence in the US 
suggests that a manufacturing plant in the 
90th percentile of the productivity distribution 
produces almost twice as much with the same 
inputs as the 10th percentile plant.  These differ-
ences stem from variation in internal practices 
as well as the influence of external conditions.38
The latest data suggest about a quarter of 
performance gaps between businesses can be 
attributed to differences in managers’ practices 
in monitoring, use of targets and people man-
agement.39 There are significant differences in 
management performance between countries, 
but the story is also one of variation (Figure 28). 
The US and Japan have high levels of manage-
ment practice across the board, while the UK is 
more middling. While the UK has a good share 
of businesses scoring in the cross-country top 
quartile for management practice, we also have 
a long tail of poorly managed firms, scoring in 
the bottom quartile.
38 Syverson (2011).
39 Bloom et al. (2012).
The workplace
Headlines
  Some UK businesses are world-class, but too many are weakly managed.
  The business population has seen a fall in dynamism, impeding productivity growth.
  High Performance Working (HPW) can help make better use of skills, but is adopted by few.
  Long-term trends in work and technology will make improved workplace management critical.
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Declining business dynamism
Differences in the way workplaces are managed 
result in differences in performance, which 
aggregate to make a substantial impact 
on prospects for economic growth. As we 
mentioned at the end of the last section, one 
of the major contributors to slowing produc-
tivity has been the way some businesses seem 
to have have hoarded skilled labour even as 
output declined. 
Before 2008, hiring was concentrated among 
firms whose output was growing. During and 
after recession, an increased proportion of 
firms (rising from 11 per cent to 20 per cent) 
saw shrinking output while keeping employ-
ment stable.40 While some hoarding may 
have been employers seeking to retain skilled 
employees as prized assets, there are signs 
that this was part of a pattern of increasingly 
poor resource allocation across businesses.
40 Barnett et al. (2014a, 2014b).
In common with other advanced economies, 
it is the UK’s newer businesses which lead net 
employment growth. But the UK’s surviving 
established businesses still make a significant 
contribution to net job creation – whereas in 
most advanced economies, their contribution is 
negative (Figure 29).41
That picture of established business having 
an important role fits with some of the recent 
evidence on differences in business produc-
tivity. In the run-up to the recession, new busi-
nesses were on average no more productive 
than established businesses. Instead, estab-
lished businesses were by far the main contrib-
utors to productivity growth.
In itself, this may just mean that our established 
businesses perform well, and their leading role 
reflects that. But productivity growth does not 
always direct resources to the best-performing 
businesses. 
41 Criscuolo et al. (2014).
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Before the recession, for every ten low-pro-
ductivity businesses leaving the market, six 
high-productivity businesses followed.42 If 
resources had been allocated to the best-per-
forming business as well in 2007 as in 1998, 
productivity would have been 7.4 percentage 
points higher.43 
Altogether, we get a picture of a decreasingly 
dynamic business population, where aggregate 
performance is determined too much by 
survival and ‘getting by’ rather than growth and 
innovation, and where new businesses are of 
only limited competitive impact.
42 Bravo-Biosca and Westlake (2014).
43 Bravo-Biosca and Westlake (2014).
Perhaps reflecting this climate, where the most 
productive businesses find it difficult to grow, 
the UK combines a relatively large share of em-
ployment in large businesses and in micro busi-
nesses, leaving the small- and medium-sized 
share smaller than in some other leading 
economies (Figure 30).
The upshot is that better productivity prospects 
will come from increasing the number of 
rapidly expanding ‘scale-up’ companies. This 
seems to be where the UK lags behind leading 
advanced economies: too few of our business-
es find the strategy and capability to break out 
from their initial small scale.
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Figure 29 Contributions to net employment growth by business age, 2001-2011
Source: Criscuolo et al. (2014).
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The potential benefits to economic growth of 
removing this constraint, and achieving a more 
dynamic business population, are substantial.44
Management talent
If we have a long tail or poorly-managed 
businesses, what about those managing and 
leading in our workplaces? Here again, we know 
there are issues. 3 per cent of managers are 
perceived as lacking full proficiency, and one in 
five manager vacancies are hard-to-fill because 
of skills shortages.45
Typically these skills can be technical or 
practical (cited by 58 per cent of employers) but 
they also involve planning and organisation (51 
per cent) and strategic management (47 per 
cent). Worryingly, significant numbers report 
problems finding managerial candidates with 
sufficient literacy (20 per cent) or numeracy (23 
per cent).
44 Coutu (2014).
45 UKCES research by Winterbotham et al. (2014).
Internationally, there are causes for concern. 
In the OECD Survey of Adult Skills we find that 
while the UK46 has a high proportion of mana-
gerial employees in the workforce – reflecting 
a large number of micro enterprises, but also 
sector differences favouring a large manage-
ment workforce (Figure 31).
But interestingly, while in most advanced 
economies there is a large qualification gap 
between managers and employees, it is much 
smaller in the UK. Figure 32 shows that while 
the UK has an average number of graduate 
non-managerial employees (24 per cent), the 
proportion of graduate managerial employees 
is somewhat below average (39 per cent vs. 56 
per cent across participating countries).
Given their importance in British workplaces, 
the difficulties recruiting, and the lower qualifi-
cation profile of British managers, it’s surprising 
that they are less likely to be trained than most 
employees. 50 per cent of managers were 
trained in 2013, compared to 70 per cent of 
professionals, and fewer than any other major 
occupational group.
Not making full use of our skills
Let’s turn now to the wider workforce. Existing 
businesses employ by far the largest share of 
the workforce. 90 per cent of today’s workforce 
will still be employed 10 years from now. Any 
improvements in productivity will depend on 
the performance of existing employees in 
existing businesses.
Therefore, it isn’t just employee skill levels that 
will matter for long-term growth prospects; 
it also depends on workplaces making the 
best use of the skills they have available. That 
applies to businesses large or small, growing, 
declining, or stable.
46 Note only England and Northern Ireland participated in 
the survey.
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Certainly, there is evidence before and since 
the recession that we’re not always effective 
at using employees’ skills effectively. Figure 
33 sets out the levels of overskilling and over-
qualification. Overall, more than a third of 
employees had qualifications beyond those 
necessary to be hired for their current job. 
That’s equivalent to around 11 million workers.
Those most likely to be overqualified are con-
centrated in sales and customer service roles 
and elementary roles, both with overqualifi-
cation rates of more than 60 per cent. Young 
people (aged 20-24) are much more likely than 
average to be overqualified (more than 50 per 
cent), although some of this reflects the early 
stage of their career.
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Figure 31 Managers as a share of employees, by country
Figure 32 Managerial and non-managerial graduate employment, by country
Source: Figure 31 and Figure 32 are from UKCES analysis of OECD PIAAC. Dotted lines on Figure 32 are 
average levels across countries. Note England/N Ireland only because of survey participation.
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Contrary to speculation, overqualification is 
much more a problem among those with inter-
mediate qualifications than it is for graduates. 
Paradoxically, given the UK’s relatively low 
share of workers with intermediate skills, those 
workers often find themselves doing work 
which is below the level they are qualified for.
Formal qualifications only serve as an imperfect 
proxy for skills. Many of the most pressing 
workplace skill shortages relate to practical 
skills, and so it’s possible to be formally over-
qualified while still not being fully competent 
for a role.
Fewer than half of those who are formally 
overqualified are also overskilled in this wider 
sense. But that still means that 15 per cent – or 
nearly one worker in six – are estimated to be 
‘real overqualified’ in this way i.e. in possession 
of both formal qualifications and skills in excess 
of those required for the job. And alongside 
these were a larger number of workers who 
perceive their skills not to be fully used even 
if their qualifications are matched to their job 
requirements.
Overskilling declined a little from 2006 to 2012, 
but again much of this change was among 
graduates. A large number of workers remain 
overskilled or overqualified. In both cases, 
underutilisation represents a waste of talent 
and has significant consequences. Employees 
unable to use the skills that they have invested 
in are less likely to feel motivated, and as a 
result are less likely to make the discretionary 
commitment to make further efforts in the 
workplace.
But the concentration of overskilling and over-
qualification seems to be among those with in-
termediate skills. Recent analysis confirms this: 
the rising share of graduates (from 31 to 42 
per cent of the workforce) has found a similarly 
rising share of jobs making use of graduate-lev-
el skills (from 32 to 40 per cent of jobs).47 This 
trend raises an important question: if we are to 
raise the prospects of those with low skills, will 
our workplaces generate the job opportunities 
to make use of their improved skills?
47 Green and Henseke (2014).
Source: Skills and Employment Surveys, 2006 and 2012.
Status 2006 2012
Overqualified, comprising 39.1 36.8
Real over-qualification 17.0 15.2
Formal over-qualification 22.2 21.7
Over-skilled 32.5 30.1
Under-qualified 13.4 10.7
Qualification-matched, including 47.5 52.5
matched but over-skilled 11.9 11.9
Figure 33 Qualification and skill mismatch, 2006 and 2012
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Too few high performance workplaces
The evidence on overskilling and overquali-
fication suggests that too many workplaces 
are leaving skills underused. Just as we saw 
in discussing the long tail of weakly managed 
firms and the growing low productivity busi-
nesses, there seem to be too many workplaces 
which use only the skills they need to fulfil their 
immediate requirements, and give no thought 
to what they could do with the full range of 
employees’ skills.
Such an approach hints at the lack of 
ambition which characterises too many British 
workplaces – those we’ve seen which have 
weak management, and survive through 
markets which aren’t as effective at weeding 
out poor performers as they used to be. 
By contrast, those businesses operating in 
intensely competitive markets for high-value 
products and services go out of their way to 
recruit highly-skilled workforces and to invest 
in the skills of their workforce, just as they are 
more likely to adopt best practice management 
techniques.48
Much like the presence of weak manage-
ment practices, businesses operating without 
competitive pressures and strong leader-
ship ambition are much less likely to develop 
a workplace culture which nurtures and 
leverages talent – so called high performance 
working (HPW). Certainly, over many years the 
UK Commission’s research has demonstrated 
that the adoption of such an approach has 
been confined to a relatively small number of 
workplaces. Case studies have shown the com-
plexity of securing success not only in the UK 
but internationally too.49
48 UKCES research by Mason and Constable (2011).
49 UKCES research by Stone (2011).
HPW is difficult to measure because there is 
no one silver bullet; it cannot be reduced to 
a recipe of universally applicable practices. 
Instead, it seeks to create a culture or ethos 
characterised by a commitment to identify, 
develop and fully use the talents of the 
workforce. Its benefits come through better 
job design, not only matching skills to work, 
but also giving employees autonomy to engage 
them in improving their own performance. It’s 
through such synergistic effects, unlocking the 
potential of talent across the whole business, 
that more significant sum gains are achieved.50
The UK Commission’s Employer Skills Survey 
attempts to capture variations in adoption 
of the approach across the UK through a 
series of questions relating to recognised 
HPW practices. These range from improved 
planning through task discretion and measures 
to enhance participation in decision-making. 
Whilst inevitably an imperfect measure, unable 
to capture fully the “softer” cultural side of the 
approach it is nevertheless a useful guide.
The survey found that only 12 per cent of 
employers can be classified as fully embracing 
HPW, in the sense that they have adopted 
14 out of 21 HPW practices. Moreover, HPW 
employers are concentrated in particular 
sectors of the economy. For example 36 per 
cent of employers in public administration, 
education and financial services are HPW 
employers, whilst in contrast, only one in 25 per 
cent of construction firms are.
HPW employers are driven to adopt the 
approach by pressure to improve performance, 
either from competition or the need to manage 
the consequences of rapid growth.51 Under-
standing the links between the circumstances 
of a workplace and its engagement with HPW 
has motivated some new analysis (see box, 
next page).
50 UKCES research by Belt and Giles (2009).
51 Cox et al. (2012).
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While there’s a lot to be done to ensure that 
workers have the right qualifications and skills, 
much more of performance lies in employers 
deploying skills effectively, and employees being 
motivated to apply discretionary effort where it 
will make for significant gains.
High Performance Working (HPW) is a holistic 
approach which aim to do just this, creating a 
workplace culture valuing talent across the four 
domains of:
  access (recruitment and resourcing)
  ability (workforce skills and training)
  attitude (engagement and motivation)
  application (deploying skills)
HPW works on the basis that the skills of the 
existing workforce and new recruits are not 
sufficient to ensure high performance. Instead, 
individual workers must have the motivation 
and opportunity to apply their skills and con-
tribute discretionary effort in the workplace, to 
innovate and be productive. This in turn creates 
a culture for continuous improvement.
HPW adoption is highly variable, and looking at 
the formal adoption of this or that practice can 
mislead: larger workplaces are likely to adopt, 
but often have significant implementation gaps; 
smaller workplaces may have informal solutions 
to the same problems. Genuine assessments 
need to overcome these potential pitfalls.
At the same time, understanding the different 
approaches to HPW can help us to shed light on 
the potential paths to adoption. For that reason, 
we have used the data from the UK Commis-
sion’s Employer Skills Survey, combined with 
insights from our broader work with employers, 
to segment small-to-medium-sized establish-
ments (5 to 99 employees, including many of 
those critical to improving growth prospects) 
according to their choices on HPW adoption. 
We collected the 21 practices into five different, 
indices of HPW adoption, and used these to 
develop segments of establishments according 
to their HPW approach. At the top, we found 
Organisers, who are typically large organisa-
tions, strong on most measures – but especially 
in organisational investment.
High Performance Working Practices: which businesses, and how?
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Figure 34 HPW segments, employee shares Figure 35 HPW factor scores, by segment
Source: further analysis of UKCES Employer Skills 
Survey 2013, 5-99 employee establishments.
Source: further analysis of UKCES Employer Skills 
Survey 2013, 5-99 employee establishments.
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Then we found Developers – similarly strong on 
all counts, but with a real emphasis on training 
and giving their employees autonomy. Develop-
ers exist across the full size range, and are con-
centrated in financial services, real estate, and 
transport and communications. They’re charac-
terised by particularly acute skills shortages, and 
a high proportion of highly skilled staff.
Recruiters are not far off joining the ranks of 
Developers except for their lack of training and 
devleopment. They clearly hire well and give 
their workers autonomy, but they don’t perceive 
skills gaps or skills shortages greater than the 
average.
Trainers represent perhaps the greatest 
potential for improvement: cutting across 
size and sectors, they perceive high levels of 
skills gaps and skills shortage, and they are 
committed to training. But on the other indi-
cators, they’re middling at best; and they don’t 
offer their workers much autonomy.
Freeriders are to Trainers as Recruiters are to 
Developers: their difference is that they’re less 
likely to train. But in contrast to Recruiters, they 
perceive above-average levels of skills gaps and 
skills shortage – but that doesn’t seem to move 
them to act.
At the bottom of the scale are the Plodders 
and the Survivors. Survivors are dominated by 
very small establishments (5 to 9 employees), 
in non-tradable service sectors, and employ a 
lot of middle-skill and labour-intensive workers. 
They seem likely to be part of that large number 
of incumbent, mature micro businesses with 
few prospects; they employ few highly-qualified 
workers, and have a distinct lack of professional 
and technical workers.
Plodders meanwhile do suffer from skills 
shortages, but are average in every way except 
one: they are highly unwilling to offer bonus or 
performance rewards, or flexible benefits, to 
motivate their employees. They are concentrat-
ed heavily in the wholesale and retail sector.
These segments help us to understand just 
how much choice there is in the selection 
of workplace strategy; and just how much 
difference it can make for opportunity and 
performance. Furthermore, by understanding 
how HPW practices tend to complement one 
another, we can understand which establish-
ments may, at the margin, be prepared to 
deepen their investment in workplace innova-
tion and improvement. This presents a valuable 
focus for our future research in this area.
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Figure 36 Skills gaps and shortages Figure 37 High-skill workforce
Source: further analysis of UKCES Employer Skills 
Survey 2013, 5-99 employee establishments.
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Skills and innovation at work
Economic and technological trends will make 
these questions of skills use and workplace 
practice ever more important (see box, page 
49).
Using a broad definition, covering those 
engaged in introducing new and improved 
products and services, changing organisa-
tions and practices, and engaging in training, 
research and development, fewer than half of 
businesses innovate.52
Larger enterprises are a little more likely to 
innovate, and that includes the wider, non-tech-
nological forms of innovation of which HPW 
forms a part. Changes to work organisation 
have been introduced by just 18 per cent of 
all enterprises, only half the number to have 
engaged in any innovation (Figure 38).53
52 Hooker and Achur (2013).
53 Hooker and Achur (2013).
Given the evidence on business dynamism set 
out earlier in this section, it’s instructive to see 
that certain skills concentrate in innovative 
businesses.
Figure 39 shows the shares of employees in 
‘broad innovator’ and ‘non-innovator’ business-
es with a range of particular skills. While inno-
vative businesses may demonstrate a broader 
creativity, they also have a much greater share 
of the skills needed to solve complex problems 
and make use of new technology.
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Figure 38 Enterprises innovating, 2013 Figure 39 Employees with innovative skills
Source: BIS UK Innovation Survey 2013. Source: BIS UK Innovation Survey 2013.
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The last 20 years have seen huge changes in 
the labour market driven by a range of factors, 
including the inter-linked forces of globalisation 
and technology.  On the current pace of change, 
we can expect even greater transformation in 
the years to come; the typical workplace of 2030 
willl look very different to what we see today. 
We cannot predict what will happen in the 
future but we can explore the possibilities. We 
can systematically make sense of the potential 
directions of travel and assess the key uncer-
tainties that we know exist.  From this we can 
start to position ourselves to anticipate future 
opportunities rather than waiting to react.
Our Future of Work study seeks to trigger 
debate about how we can do just that.1 The 
study uses foresight techniques to explore the 
labour market of 2030 and is based on a robust, 
evidence based approach, including a compre-
hensive literature review, expert interviews and 
high-level workshops.
Mapping existing trends
A key part of making sense of the future is 
to explore the trajectory of the trends which 
already have a significant impact. Some of 
these trends have the potential to reshape the 
workplace in radical ways:
  Convergence of innovation: more and 
more innovations take place at the borders 
of disciplines and sectors. This stimulates a 
hybridization of skills as well as collabora-
tions with customers and suppliers.
  Interconnectivity and collaboration: jobs 
will become increasingly virtual and remote, 
modes of production will extend across 
greater distance as falling costs allow for 
24-hour production. 
1 UKCES research by Störmer et al. (2014).
  The development of ICT will continue to 
offer increasing performance. The amount 
of data generated by the digital economy is 
growing rapidly; it offers massive potential 
for efficiency gains and new business 
models, changing the way we work.
  Demographic change: the labour force 
aging as the ‘baby boom’ generation reaches 
retirement. Older people are participating 
in work longer and workplaces are likely to 
become more multi-generational, with four 
generations working together.
Disruptions
Extrapolation of existing, established, trends 
can only tell us so much. The study identifies 
potential disruptions from current trends that 
have radical implications for jobs and skills.  
Some of the key examples include:
  Alternative centres of excellence: what 
if the new wave of Asian cities were able to 
take global leadership of sectors and activi-
ties upon which the UK has a strong reliance, 
such as financial services?
  Robotics and artificial intelligence: new 
developments and applications already allow 
for automation, but what if such technolo-
gies could be used to automate swathes of 
existing jobs, including those of today’s pro-
fessional workers?
Key messages
Our assessment of the trends and disruptions 
points towards a series of key implications for 
jobs and skills.  Individuals and employers will 
need competencies to work across different dis-
ciplines, to collaborate virtually, to demonstrate 
cultural sensitivity and respond to increasingly 
flexible working practices as well keeping up 
with the new skills that new technologies will 
demand. Ensuring a supply of workforce skills 
in an increasingly virtual world in which organ-
isational boundaries are less well-defined will 
require businesses to collaborate around skills 
development.
The Future of Work
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Particularly in service sectors, getting the right 
skills in the right places and eliciting not only 
effort but creativity are critical steps for per-
formance improvement. In growing sectors, 
the demands for new skills all point in favour 
of getting workers to apply those discretionary 
efforts: problem-solving, planning and organ-
isation, customer-handling and team-working 
are all in high demand (Figure 40).
Yet too many workplaces are content to settle 
around ways of working optimised for the 
lowest possible skill level, allowing employee 
skills to go to waste for want of ambition. We 
see this through the long tail of management 
practice, limited action on management skills, 
and the levels of oveskill and overqualification.
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Figure 40 Skills that need improving, by skills gaps in each broad occupational group
Source: UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013 (Table 80/1).
Workplaces are critical
Different workplace approaches carry real 
consequences for business growth and perfor-
mance. At a more basic level, failure to engage 
with the challenges of making use of employee 
talents can also be bad for survival: evidence 
from private sector workplaces in the UK are 
that investing in workforce training raises 
survival rates by 13 per cent and that survival 
rates are higher for higher-skilled businesses.54
As we explored in our discussion of growth 
prospects, in the long term employment has 
and been growing and looks set to continue 
growing in favour of knowlege- and service-in-
tensive sectors. In these market environments, 
it is increasingly workforce skills and their use 
which distinguish leading businesses.
54 Collier et al. (2011).
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The hourglass effect
Job polarisation has emerged as an important 
explanation of several labour market changes 
which have taken place since the 1970s. The 
discussion was well advanced before the 
recession of 2008-9, although events since 
then have heightened interest.55
A summary story of job polarisation and its 
‘hourglass’ effect goes as follows: trade and 
technology complement high-skill labour in 
doing complex or creative work. But it also sub-
stitutes middle-skilled labour engaged in more 
routine tasks.
Together these two effects drive economic 
growth: highly-skilled workers are more pro-
ductive, and we can deliver routine work more 
efficiently. That economic growth then drives 
an increased demand for those service roles 
which can’t easily be automated because they 
require social interaction or high levels of 
manual dexterity.56
With very different institutional frameworks, 
most European labour markets show signs 
of just these changes (Figure 41). In all cases, 
high-skilled managerial and professional work 
has risen, service-intensive roles are stable 
and rising, and middle-skill and labour-inten-
sive roles are in decline. The UK stands out 
as a leader in the trend, along with Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. 
55 Looking at the US, Jaimovich and Siu (2012) investigate 
the potential for polarisation to intensify amidst recession.
56 An additional contributor to rising service-intensive 
roles is demographic change as society ages.
Those same sectors driving employment 
growth also drive another trend: their workforc-
es are made up increasingly of highly-skilled 
workers with analytical and creative skills, and 
low-skilled workers engaged in service delivery. 
While we’ve seen especially a great expansion 
in the number of high-skilled, graduate-level 
roles, the traditional middle-skill roles – clerical 
workers and tradesmen – have seen their 
numbers decline. That combination is often 
referred to as the ‘hourglass’ labour market.
It’s a trend across the advanced economies, 
and is sometimes mistakenly simplified as a 
threat. Yet the ‘hourglass’ effect in many ways 
represents great opportunities: rising demand 
for high-skilled work, and increased efficiency 
with the potential to lower costs for consumers.
Certainly in the UK, it’s the rise in high-skilled 
work which continues to the defining change 
to the labour market. That’s a positive devel-
opment: it’s supported a rapid expansion in 
the graduate workforce, while maintaining the 
higher rates of pay graduates jobs have tradi-
tionally attracted.
But while that’s a positive prospect overall, the 
concern is that this ‘polarisation’ of the labour 
market will see workers without high-level skills 
facing fewer opportunities. Where once these 
workers could rely on middle-skill roles as the 
basis of a career characterised by decent pay 
and progression, there is the risk that many 
end up in lower-paid jobs without the estab-
lished pathways to move upwards.
Opportunity
Headlines
  The labour market is polarising – but change is driven chiefly by growing high-skilled work.
  High-skilled jobs are changing, with rising expectations for skills and performance.
  Middle-skilled jobs’ decline has consequences for career opportunities.
  Signs are that these consequences are focused on new entrants rather than existing workers.
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There is no shortage of research on the expe-
rience of job polarisation in advanced econo-
mies.57 The interaction of falling trade barriers, 
the falling cost of computer power and new 
modes of work organisation all have parts to 
play. As growth has increasingly come from 
knowledge- and service-intensive sectors, it 
has raised the importance of skill, technology 
and organisation. Efforts to drive efficiencies 
through new technology and the adoption of 
new business models have together focused 
on ways of minimising routine activity.
57 Acemoglu and Autor (2010) is a comprehensive 
statement of the theory and approach. Goos and Manning 
(2007), Sissons (2011), Bisello (2013), Plunkett and Pessoa 
(2013) and McIntosh (2013) all focus on the UK. Autor et 
al. (2003) gives an early look at the US. Goos et al. (2009) 
look across EU member states. Spitz-Oener (2006) looks at 
Germany. Autor (2014) gives an overview of the concepts 
and evidence.
The result has been a sustained shift away from 
jobs which deliver those routine tasks. These 
effects have worked through in different ways. 
Many skilled trades roles have declined as the 
UK’s industrial production has increasingly 
concentrated in its high-value, high-skill special-
isms, with a substantial reduction in its employ-
ment profile.
On the other hand, clerical, administrative and 
secretarial roles have fallen across sectors 
even as service sectors have expanded. Here, 
technological change has played a critical role: 
the need for massed ranks of typists and clerks 
has declined sharply as computerisation has 
allowed much easier access and manipulation 
of information.
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Figure 41 Employment shares by broad occupational group, 10 EU member states
Source: Eurostat, ELFS, ‘lfsa egised’. Major breaks in series reflect changes in occupational classification.
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Figure 42 highlights the continuing nature of 
the change over three time periods; the third 
uses our Working Futures projections to look 
ahead to 2022. In each case, occupations are 
ranked according to their wage percentile at 
the start of the period. We then look at how 
their respective share of employment has 
changed over time, and the ‘hourglass’ pattern 
of increase and decrease is striking: middle-skill 
jobs with mid-level pay are in decline, while es-
pecially high-skill jobs are growing..
The data suggest that this isn’t simply a shift of 
job titles. The high-skilled occupations especial-
ly seem to be marked by substantial changes 
which align well with the hourglass hypothesis, 
and set them apart from other roles. 
First, reflecting their complementarity with 
computer technologies, high-skilled roles have 
seen a sustained increase in the computer 
skills required to do the job (Figure 43). Second, 
reflecting a tendency to upskill, there is an in-
creasing use of a degree requirement in hiring 
in high-skill jobs (Figure 44).
High Middle Service Labour
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Figure 43 Computer skill levels needed by broad occupational group, 1997-2012
Figure 44 Qualification requirements (degree vs. none) by broad occupational group, 1986-2012
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Good news, but some risks
Luckily, the UK seems to have a lopsided 
hourglass: High-skill jobs have expanded sub-
stantially over recent decades, and our Working 
Futures projections suggest this will continue.
Over the period 1992-2022, we project that 
there will be some 7m additional high-skill man-
agerial and professional jobs, alongside 2.4m 
additional service-intensive roles.These gains 
are offset by the loss of 2m middle-skill and 
0.7m labour-intensive roles. So the good news 
is quite plain to see: over a 30 year period we 
add 6.7m net new jobs, and nearly three-quar-
ters of the additions are in high-skill roles.
It’s this process which has allowed for the rapid 
expansion of the graduate workforce since 
the 1980s without the loss of the graduate 
premium in earnings: supply has just kept pace 
with demand. As we have seen that expansion 
had been an important factor in productivity 
growth until the onset of recession in 2008-9; 
and since then it has helped blunt the worst 
effects of the slowdown.58
58 Holland et al. (2013) estimate that a 1 per cent increase 
in the graduate share of the workforce raises the productiv-
ity level by 0.2 to 0.5 per cent.
As well as the wider economy, that change 
has been great news for those large numbers 
benefiting from the increased opportunities of 
university education and then graduate-level 
high-skilled work. As the graduate workforce 
continues to expand, it looks set to bring 
further benefits.
But what about the rest of the workforce? The 
worry is that the decline in middle-skill jobs es-
pecially means a loss of opportunity for those 
not able to enter high-skill jobs. Certainly mid-
dle-skill jobs are characterised by better pay 
(Figure 45) and better pay mobility (Figure 46) 
than service-intensive or labour-intensive roles.
Another question is: what about those who 
gain high-level skills but don’t make it into 
high-level careers. The good news here is that 
the labour market has seemingly managed 
to maintain its ability to match graduates to 
graduate jobs amidst the rapid expansion of 
recent years. But the stable level of 30 per cent 
of graduates mismatched to jobs requiring 
lower skill level means a much larger number of 
overqualified graduates than we had before.59
59 Green and Henseke (2014).
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Figure 45 Distribution across pay quintiles by broad occupational group, since 2011
Source: UKCES analysis of Labour Force Survey, using hourly pay deflated by CPI to define quintiles.
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Risks from polarisation
The risks for mismatched graduates are 
perhaps more simply summarised. Recent 
research has shown that while the rate of 
graduate mismatch is stable, the consequences 
are becoming greater.
Graduates in non-graduate occupations 
continue to earn more than their colleagues in 
the same job. But graduates in ‘graduate jobs’ 
earn an increasing premium. Where matched 
graduates earned 47 per cent more in in the 
1990s, they now earn 67 per cent more.60
60 Green and Henseke (2014).
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That’s a telling indicator: skills pay, but they pay 
more where they’re needed. For mismatched 
graduates as well as less skilled workers, 
another telling indicator is the degree to 
which the UK labour market is marked for its 
split between jobs requiring high or minimal 
education (Figure 47).
Perhaps reflecting the large number of work-
places less interested in developing and 
applying employee skills, the UK has the sec-
ond-highest share of jobs seen by employees 
as requiring only primary education. Those 
unable to reach expanding high-skill opportuni-
ties find only limited outlets for their skills.
And just as skills pay when they’re needed, 
those with limited skills find themselves in jobs 
where pay is low. In fact, low-skilled people 
in the UK are paid less on average than their 
counterparts in other countries participating 
in the OECD Survey of Adult Skills, while high-
skilled people are paid more (Figure 48).61
61 Note that only England and Northern Ireland participat-
ed in the survey.
The same evidence also helps to shed light on 
the high level of over-skilling and over-qualifica-
tion among those with intermediate qualifica-
tions. The UK’s large number of jobs designed 
for those with very little education offer little 
outlet for those with middle- or high-level skills.
Graduate work and job quality
Meanwhile, even for those graduates who are 
successful in finding graduate work, the future 
may not be all that we think it is. Traditional-
ly, the assumption has been that managerial 
and high-skill work offers a high level of job 
quality: while higher in pressure, the greater 
pay, autonomy and control were more than 
adequate compensation.
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Just as trade, outsourcing, and new technology 
is putting pressure on middle-skill employees’ 
roles, it is having a particular effect in changing 
some of the traditionally more secure, auton-
omous work in knowledge-intensive sectors. 
To compete with the high-skilled workforce in 
emerging markets, there is the potential for a 
shift, so-called ‘digital Taylorism’, where stan-
dardisation and proceduralisation reshapes 
high-skilled work.62
If high-skilled jobs’ expansion is characterised 
by a fall in job quality in this way, while mid-
dle-skill employment is in decline, it has the 
potential to adversely effect the UK’s perfor-
mance on job quality (Figure 49 and Figure 50). 
Job quality in the UK is good in international 
comparison; but it has already been diminished 
through the effects of recession, with increas-
ing insecurity and work intensity reducing 
employee well-being.63
62 Brown et al. (2011).
63 See e.g. Festead et al. (2012), Green et al. (2012).
The declining middle
What about the direct consequences of the 
decline in the number of middle-skill jobs for 
those without tertiary-level education? The 
chief concern – motivating much of the discus-
sion about job polarisation – is of an increasing 
number of displaced middle-skill workers left 
with no alternative but a ‘dead-end’ service-in-
dustry job, or of new workers who never get to 
start a middle-skill career.
This concern can be exaggerated, with phrases 
such as “hollowing out” thrown around all too 
easily. The hourglass effect does not mean an 
end to middle-skill roles. In fact, because of 
lifecycle and career changes, even to maintain 
their smaller overall numbers will require sub-
stantial new recruitment: in Working Futures, we 
project some 1.1m administrative and secre-
tarial job openings, and 0.9m in skilled trades 
(Figure 51).
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Consequently, although the total numbers 
of traditional middle-skill roles look likely to 
continue to fall, there will still be opportunities. 
So it’s not a great surprise to find that are also 
skills shortages at these levels – including espe-
cially the skilled trades.
It’s also important to remember that our ideas 
about jobs change over time. Certainly, it’s 
true that that service-intensive roles are often 
characterised by high turnover and limited pro-
gression.64 But it’s a mistake to assume that job 
designs are preserved in aspic.
As demand for some of those roles grow, it 
is likely they will also evolve. The question is 
whether they will evolve quickly enough, and 
result in new career pathways that can create 
those progression opportunities.
64 Lloyd and Mayhew (2010).
But all those factors aside, what have been the 
consequences so far of the declining number 
of middle-skill jobs? Evidence from the US 
suggests that the decline is less likely to affect 
those currently in the middle-skill workforce 
than those trying to enter it.
In simple terms, the declining overall demand 
allows employers to prefer those with existing 
experience and their highly valuable job-spe-
cific practical skills. Meanwhile, for the unem-
ployed and for new entrants to the labour 
market, the prospects of gaining work are 
sharply reduced.65
By comparing the flows to and from broad 
occupational groups, as well as to and from 
non-employment, we find that comparing the 
mid-1990s to the early-2010s, our own analysis 
finds similar results, including:
  Increased flow to and from high-skilled 
work, and also to middle-skill and service-in-
tensive work.
65 Smith (2013), Cortes et al., (2014)..
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  Increased outflow from middle-skill work 
to other forms of employment, a change 
unmatched in any other occupational group.
  Significant increases in the flow from 
service- and labour-intensive work to other 
employment.
Further exploration suggests that much of 
the increased outflow from middle-skill roles 
to other work is attributable to non-graduate 
workers. More positively, non-graduates leaving 
middle-skill roles seem on this initial analysis as 
likely to ‘bump up’ to high-skill roles as ‘bump 
down’ into service-intensive or labour-intensive 
roles.
Figure 53 Share of younger and older workers by broad occupational group, since 1993
High Middle Service Labour
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Young people and polarisation
Young people seem much more likely to move 
to service-intensive jobs, and much less likely to 
move to middle-skill roles. The consequences 
show through in the changing occupational 
structure of the workforce across different age 
groups.
In Figure 52 we focus on those over 21 (to 
filter out the effects of expanding university 
participation). We see that while the over-30s 
and over-50s have seen a fall in their share of 
middle-skill work, it’s more than offset by an 
increase in their share of high-skilled work.
But 22-29 year olds have seen a decline in mid-
dle-skill work and, since 2005, high-skilled work. 
Instead, 22-29 year olds have seen the biggest 
increase going to service-intensive roles. We 
can see that effect in the middle-skill workforce 
(Figure 53) ‘getting older’ relative to the wider 
workforce.66 
66 For US evidence on ageing, see Autor and Dorn (2009).
As a wider trend, we can see how, from 2005 
to 2012, there has been a decisive shift in the 
lifecycle pattern of employment and earnings 
– with young people less likely to be working 
(Figure 54) and taking several years longer to 
reach median hourly pay (Figure 55).
Taken together, these patterns suggest a 
general pattern of middle-skill decline hitting 
hardest on new arrivals. Where established, 
experienced workers either stay in middle-skill 
work or move up to high-skill work, younger 
workers seem to find it more difficult to enter 
into middle-skill work. At the same time, they 
have – at least through the period including 
the recent recession – also found it difficult 
to enter the growing high-skilled workforce, 
leading to concerns about their future progres-
sion prospects.
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Figure 54 Lifecycle employment rates Figure 55 Lifecycle hourly pay as % median
Source: UKCES analysis of Labour Force Survey. Source: UKCES analysis of Labour Force Survey.
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Investing in learning
Individuals recognise the value of learning 
and development, and invest heavily in it. 
Some 93 per cent of people feel learning is 
something you should do throughout your life. 
But this doesn’t always translate into action for 
everyone. You are more likely to learn if you are 
employed; in higher skilled full time work; and 
if you work in certain sectors such as the public 
sector, energy and financial services.
Motivations also change over the lifecycle, 
which may affect not only the propensity to 
engage, but also its purpose. For example, 
where younger workers will often pursue more 
career-focused development, older workers are 
more likely to fulfil personal interests.
There are various different indicators of 
learning across the UK. Worryingly, these point 
to one important and common trend; a signifi-
cant decline in engagement, whether captured 
through participation rates, average training 
volume or funding.
Interestingly too this decline began well before 
the recession. The average participation rate 
in training over the last four weeks for those in 
work rose during the 1990s from 12.8 per cent 
in 1995 to a peak of 15 per cent in 2001 and 
then back to 13 per cent in 2010, where it has 
remained steady ever since.
Wider measures of learning have also seen 
declines. For instance the 2010 National 
Adult Learning Survey, which captures formal 
learning leading to a qualification as well as 
informal learning, has identified an 11 percent-
age point decline overall between 2005 and 
2010.67 
Adult participation in all categories of learning 
in the three years preceding the survey was 69 
per cent, down from 80 per cent in 2005.68 The 
most prominent decline has been in taught, 
classroom-based learning; Figure 56 shows that 
every broad occupational group has seen some 
decline in off-the-job training.
67 BIS (2012).
68 BIS (2012).
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Figure 56 Job-related education and training in the last 13 weeks, by broad occupational group
Source: UKCES analysis of Labour Force Survey, using ED13WK and JOBTRN.
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Equally, the NIACE Adult Participation in 
Learning survey, which covers the whole of 
the UK, has also seen a decline since 2001, 
with participation in learning in the last 3 
years falling from 46 to 38 per cent of adults 
in 2013.69 Perhaps more significantly, over 
a similar period, the duration of training fell 
sharply, with the result that the average training 
volume per worker declined by about half.70
Some of this owes itself to declining opportu-
nities at work. The UK Commission’s Employer 
Skills Survey identifies a 14.5 per cent real 
terms fall in expenditure between 2005 and 
2011, and the Continuing Vocational Training 
Survey suggests a more drastic fall of 29 per 
cent over a similar timeframe.71 Whilst the 
Employer Skills Survey expenditure data for 
2011 and 2013 are not directly comparable, 
they suggest a further decline of £2.4bn in 
employer investment.
Investment and opportunities to learn
The decline in learning varies, and has certainly 
been more concentrated among those with 
less prior education. But the decline is a wide-
ly-experienced change, which makes it harder 
to explain by a simple shift between workers. In 
part, yes, it is likely that there has been a falling 
engagement in or demand for learning. Indeed, 
there is evidence that a reduction in public or 
employer-funded opportunities, combined with 
the pressures on household budgets since the 
recession has had some effect. 
Over time, these developments seem likely to 
reinforce inequalities in the skill distribution. 
However, we should not jump to the conclusion 
that these developments are entirely negative. 
Investments in personal learning and develop-
ment have a cost in time and money.
69 Hughes and Aldridge (2013).
70 Green et al. (2013).
71 BIS (2013).
Where a decline in learning reflects the im-
provement in educational opportunities, 
reducing the need for remedial training, then 
a fall in investment may represent an improve-
ment. Equally, the decline in formal training 
expenditure and intensity may reflect, in some 
workplaces, an increasing opportunity to learn 
at work. Part of this may be by experience, 
but it also may be supplemented by access to 
online learning resources.
For employees of such workplaces, the oppor-
tunity for extensive formal training may have 
declined, but the skills gained by participating 
in decisions and solving problems may have 
expanded. But as we know, many – probably 
the majority – of workplaces do not seem likely 
to offer such rich opportunities to learn. And 
where they do, there are additional consider-
ations: is the knowledge transferable? Are sup-
porting online learning resources of sufficient 
quality? How do employees gain the qualifica-
tions to signal the skills they have gained?
Opportunity and the hourglass
Perspective is important: at the simplest level, 
we should keep in mind that the largest change 
is the rapid growth of high-skill roles, and even 
in decline, there will continue to be middle-skill 
job openings. Together, these changes are 
labour demand reshaping to take advantage 
of opportunities brought by changing trade 
and technology. Those opportunities make for 
better growth prospects, and are not to be 
taken for granted.
But aggregate improvement can bring losers 
as well as winners at the individual level. Tradi-
tional middle-skill jobs have provided a route 
to prosperity for many without advanced 
skills, and are well supported by strong career 
pathways. If they are to continue to decline, 
we need to identify what the decline of those 
pathways will mean for opportunity, and how 
best we might tackle the consequences.
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Even as unemployment increased rapidly 
during recession, the UK labour market has 
demonstrated persistent skills shortages in 
meeting employers’ recruitment needs. Skills 
gaps too characterise a large number of work-
places.
Evidence suggests that these problems 
impede business performance and so have 
knock-on consequences for productivity. While 
in principle, they should be transient signs 
of problems being solved, in practice skilled 
labour supply does not adapt with sufficient 
readiness.
The consequences are felt especially acutely 
in particular skills and occupations. Skills 
shortages are heavily concentrated in high-
skill roles and STEM roles, as well as in the 
skilled trades. While sectors have varying 
levels of skills shortages and skills gaps, their 
response in terms of training and investment in 
workforce skills varies on its own.
Just as we have seen that the high-skill 
workforce has expanded to meet rising 
demand, it is at higher skill levels where the 
most pressing needs will exist. But we also 
know that it is practical experience and job-spe-
cific skills that often distinguishes new recruits 
– and yet our high-level skills provision remains 
geared to an academic model, rather than a 
vocational route.
Skills shortages and gaps
As the economy and labour market have 
recovered and recruitment activity has 
increased there has been a resurgence in skill 
shortages.  Between 2011 and 2013, the UK 
Commission’s Employer Skills Survey found 
that while overall vacancies increased by 12 per 
cent, skill shortage vacancies increased by 60 
per cent.
The longer time series from the Employer Skills 
Survey that we have for England indicates that 
the volume of skill shortages is now approach-
ing its pre-recession (2007) level and that the 
proportion of vacancies that are skill shortages 
has already surpassed the 2007 position.
Skill shortages are not universal but are 
instead focused in particular roles.  Employers 
reported a total of 146,000 in 2013, and only 
around 4 per cent of workplaces are affected 
by shortages at any given time.  However, 
shortages comprise nearly a quarter of all 
vacancies, tend to be concentrated in particular 
sectors and often persist for long periods.
There is an argument that says skills shortages 
shouldn’t matter; that they are a sign of a 
problem being solved. But research has 
long shown that the labour market does not 
always find the supply of the particular skills 
in the particular place necessary. Analysis of 
skills shortages in the 1980s suggested that 
matching European levels would have meant 
0.4 per cent faster annual productivity growth.72
72 Haskel and Martin (1993).
Skills & performance
Headlines
  Skills shortages are highly focused put highly persistent and have damaging consequences.
  High-skill and STEM occupations are the most critical to performance in high-growth sectors.
  Sector experience of skills problems differ, but some sectors are much better at responding.
  There is a particular weakness in generating high-level vocational skills.
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The most common types of skills shortages 
across all occupations relate to technical, 
practical or job-specific skills. These skills 
are best gained, and can sometimes only be 
gained, in a workplace setting, illustrating the 
critical role that employers have to play in 
helping to overcome skills shortages.  Further 
shortages focus on more generic skills, like 
problem-solving, planning and organisational 
and customer-handling, as well as strategic 
management; again, these are often likely to 
be best developed through application in the 
workplace.
Skills gaps are much more widespread 
challenge than skills shortages, with 15 per 
cent of establishments reporting any skills gap. 
Looking at the proportions of staff involved, a 
total of 1.4m employees have a gap in the skills 
necessary to do their job.
Skills gaps are more evenly distributed across 
occupations, although lower-skilled occu-
pations are more prone to gaps.  Sales and 
customer service and elementary roles face the 
highest density of gaps and, taken together, 
account for around 40 per cent of the total 
volume of skills gaps.  In sectoral terms, hotels 
and restaurants faces by far the the greatest 
density of skills gaps.
Skills in high-skill and STEM roles
The UK Commission’s Employer Skills Survey 
2013 indicates that there were 58,000 skill 
shortages in higher-skill management, profes-
sional and technical occupations, accounting 
for around two-fifths of total skill shortages in 
the economy at that time.  This proportion has 
been maintained since before the recession.
Different types of skills mismatch
Skill mismatches are a signal of imbalance 
between supply and demand in the labour 
market, between the skills available and the 
skills required.  They constrain organisations 
from being able to meet market needs, oppor-
tunities or public service objectives.  Three key 
types of mismatch are described below.
Skills shortage describes a situation in which 
employers are unable to, or have difficulty in, 
employing the people they need because they 
are not available in sufficient numbers with 
the skills they require.  A key measure of this 
is skills shortage vacancies (SSV), a subset of 
vacancies, which are defined as “hard-to-fill” 
because of a lack of skills, work experience or 
qualifications in the candidates applying for a 
role.  
Whilst skill shortages represent skill deficien-
cies which arise in the ‘external’ labour market, 
skill gaps arise within the ‘internal’ labour 
market of organisations. Skill gaps occur when 
employees are not ‘fully proficient’ in their job, 
not having the skills required to undertake ef-
fectively the full range of duties expected.
To some extent an employer’s recruitment 
approach will determine whether a skills 
shortage or gap is registered.  If a candidate 
is recruited with sub-optimal skills and ex-
perience the deficiency becomes a skill gap; 
whereas if the vacancy is kept it becomes a skill 
shortage.
A reliance on migrant labour can also be a 
reflection of mismatch between skills demand 
and domestic skills supply. At the same time, 
skills mismatches can also reflect not a lack 
of skill but a failure to apply them in the 
workplace; people’s skills may be being un-
der-used.  When individuals are over-skilled 
or over-qualified for the jobs they do, this may 
reflect under-utilisation of skills, and hence 
employers not sufficiently making use of their 
employees’ available skills within the workplace. 
But it may also suggest individuals are not 
pursuing the ‘right’ qualifications or training 
valued by employers.
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Occupation SOC code Vacancies SSVs SSV % vacs
Rank 
(n)
Mechanical 
engineers
2122 2,200 1,500 69% 1 (57)
Engineering 
professionals n.e.c.
2129 2,700 1,600 59% 3 (113)
Science, engineering and 
production technicians n.e.c.
3119 2,100 1,100 56% 4 (66)
Design and development 
engineers
2126 1,800 900 51% 5 (97)
Programmers and software 
development professionals
2136 7,400 3,600 49% 7 (251)
Human resources and 
industrial relations officers
3562 11,300 4,900 44% 12 (293)
IT and telecommunications 
professionals n.e.c.
2139 2,800 1,100 40% 16 (83)
Estate agents and 
auctioneers
3544 2,600 1,000 38% 19 (100)
Special needs education 
teaching professionals
2316 800 300 38% 20 (57)
Quantity 
surveyors
2433 1,300 500 37% 21 (63)
Figure 57 Occupations with the highest levels of skills shortage
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Figure 58 Vacancies since 2007 Figure 59 Skills gaps since 2007
Source: Figure 57: UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013. 
‘n.e.c.’ is not elsewhere classified; cases where n<50 excluded; values rounded to nearest 100.  
Figure 58 and Figure 59 are from UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013 (Annex 7).
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The higher level areas that are most striking in 
terms of the prevalence of shortages are health 
professionals (primarily reflecting shortages 
of nurses and medical practitioners) and 
science, research, engineering and technology 
professionals.  Higher level shortages are con-
centrated by sector, with manufacturing most 
acutely affected, but also business services.  
In contrast to shortages at intermediate level, 
skills shortages for higher level occupations are 
disproportionately concentrated in larger firms 
and firms seeking to compete in international 
markets.
Shortages of STEM professionals affect a range 
of sectors across the economy, including manu-
facturing, computing and professional services. 
The STEM professionals category has been 
among worst affected occupational areas in 
terms of skill shortages throughout this period, 
with density levels well above the average 
recorded by each iteration of the survey.
The role of migration
One of the largest changes in the UK labour 
market through the 2000s was a sizeable 
increase in immigration. The extension of 
freedom of movement to new EU member 
states has led to an increased number of 
recent migrants employed in the UK, in all 
sectors and most parts of the country.
As Figure 60 highlights, the profile of the recent 
migrant workforce has subsided somewhat 
from the heights seen as the recession started. 
But they remain higher than a decade ago, and 
this is especially the case in the skilled trades 
and most of all in labour-intensive roles. 
While there’s broad agreement that high-skilled 
migration is beneficial, there are concerns 
that entry into low-skilled roles has negative 
consequences, in terms of pay and opportu-
nity, and perhaps sustaining businesses in a 
low skill equilibrium.1 But it’s also important to 
recognise the response of the native workforce 
to increasing migration; there is evidence of 
low-skilled native employees making use of 
their advantage in communication skills.2
1 See e.g. Migration Advisory Committee (2014).
2 Bisello (2014).
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Figure 60 The profile of recent migrant employment, by major occupation, 2003-2013
Source: UKCES analysis of Labour Force Survey.  
‘Recent migrant’ is non-UK/Irish nationals arrived within the last 5 years.
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The acute shortages of STEM professionals 
highlighted by employers are not simply a 
function of under-supply of qualified people 
from the education system.  While the volumes 
taking A levels and graduate level courses in 
some of these subjects have risen in the past 
decade, recent analysis of graduate destina-
tions show that an increasingly large share (up 
to 60 per cent) of STEM graduates immediately 
enter non-STEM roles.73
The science, research, engineering and tech-
nology professionals category has the highest 
density of skill shortages of any of the 25 oc-
cupational groups.  At 43 per cent it is almost 
twice as high as the overall average of 23 per 
cent and it is the third highest of the occu-
pational groups in terms of overall volume of 
shortages (with 13,000).
73 UKCES research by Bosworth, et al. (2013).
Figure 61 sets out occupations with the highest 
density of skills shortage, based on the UK 
Commission’s Employer Skills Survey.  The 
analysis is limited to higher skilled occupations 
for which we have sufficient data to make an 
estimate. Five of the top 10 detailed occu-
pations relate to the STEM professions, with 
mechanical engineers ranked highest here, as 
they are in the overall list of all shortages.  With 
regard to occupations with the greatest volume 
of shortages at this detailed level, programmers 
and software developers and HR officers stand 
out as the largest areas. 
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Higher skilled roles are more difficult than 
other roles to fill because of a lack of experi-
ence (84 and 60 per cent of vacancies respec-
tively) rather than formal qualifications (28 per 
cent), reinforcing the general pattern for all 
vacancies. Higher level shortages are also more 
likely to be connected to technical, practical or 
job specific skills, to advanced IT or software 
skills or to a lack of strategic management skills.
Skills shortages for middle-skill jobs
There is then a pressing need for greater 
advanced skills, especially STEM. But there 
is also a cluster of acute skills shortages at 
middle-skill level, in the skilled trades (Figure 
61). Many are concentrated in growth sectors 
– including health, business services and man-
ufacturing – and are often matched with skills 
gaps.
On the surface, this finding sits oddly with 
what we’ve discussed in this paper. After all, 
these jobs are often declining in number, so 
why should there be a shortage? But as we 
have also seen, declining numbers are typically 
achieved by cutting new entrants, and seeing 
the workforce age: such an approach then 
leads to a limit on the number available to do 
the job.
What about the problems we saw earlier, with 
under-utilisation of the skills of those with inter-
mediate qualifications? Again, looking beneath 
the surface is important. In more technical 
work, such as the skilled trades, the content 
of skills and qualifications matters as much as 
their level.
Spatial and sectoral differences
Just as skills shortages and skills gaps concen-
trate in growth-critical jobs, they also appear 
in different local and sectoral labour markets. 
These variations tell us a lot about the develop-
ment of our weaknesses in workforce skills and 
workplace practice, and also about why some 
problems carry greater consequences than 
others.
There are no areas without significant numbers 
of workplaces affected by skills gaps and skills 
shortage vacancies. Among those with the 
highest concentrations of gaps and vacancies 
are those in London and the South East which 
have a track record of leading growth. 
As Figure 62 on page 72 highlights, by 
looking at Devolved Administrations and 
English LEP areas, patterns differ importantly 
by the sort of job roles in demand. Most clearly, 
there is substantial variation in the share of 
high-skilled jobs; and a greater number leads to 
a higher rate of skills shortage. The exceptions 
to this trend are the most-productive areas, 
such as London, which also benefit from a 
deep pool of high-skilled talent.
By contrast, middle-skill and service-inten-
sive roles are subject to a lot of variety, but 
in quite limited ways. The real difference is 
with those areas with high labour-intensive 
shares of the workforce, where skills shortages 
seem to reflect a smaller local workforce. A 
story emerges here: high-skill and labour-in-
tensive skill shortages both concentrate as 
growing pains in areas shifting to a higher skill 
workforce.
We know from sector intelligence, especially 
from the UK Commission’s Employer Skills 
Survey, the difference sector and workplace 
makes to the response to skills problems. That 
applies not only to the skills demanded, but the 
variation in efforts to recruit, train and develop 
the workforce necessary to provide them.
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Figure 62 Skills shortages and gaps in local labour markets, 2013
Source: UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013. Bubbles are English LEPs and the three Devolved 
Administrations. Bubble colour is 2012 real GVA per head (UK=100). Trend lines are OLS.
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Figure 63 shows the wide variety in sector 
response in terms of the coverage of employee 
training, and its intensity. In many sectors, little 
more than half of employees receive training, 
and even then for many it is a relatively small 
amount. Even in some of our more knowl-
edge-intensive sectors, intensive training is 
highly selective.
When combined with the ‘hourglass’ factors 
reshaping employment, it’s easy to see how 
the difference between the high-skilled and 
the less-skilled can become so substantial. 
As skilled workers are typically more likely to 
receive training, the increasing scale of high-
skilled jobs and service-intensive jobs, coupled 
with typical employer practice, can make for a 
yawning gap in opportunity. 
Yet businesses know for themselves the conse-
quences of inaction here. By their own percep-
tion, lack of investment in skills development is 
an important contributory factor in the lack of 
staff proficiency.  
Around three in ten gaps are attributed to staff 
having not received appropriate training, whilst 
two-fifths are due to workers’ skills remaining 
inadequate after receiving training. Manage-
ment capability and workplace quality are also 
significant issues. Two-fifths of gaps are associ-
ated with lack of motivation. 
With all of this feedback, it’s hardly surprising 
that employers themselves recognise that a 
large minority of businesses – some four in 
ten – recognise that they should train more. 
Even among the third of workplaces where 
no training took place in the past year, one in 
three recognise a need to train (Figure 64).
Figure 63 Training levels and intensity by sector, 2013
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Source: UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013. 
Bubble size denotes percentage of employers reporting assessment of training.
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High-skills the vocational way
Vocational pathways can add relevance and 
applicability to learning. Work-based routes 
can also offer a more assured route to a 
career.  The potential benefits of this route 
are reflected in the economic returns already 
achieved by high-level vocational learners.74
But while there is a history of higher take-up 
in Scotland, the rest of the UK is patchy. The 
OECD’s recent Skills beyond School review of 
England highlighted the gap here: the post-
secondary vocational sector has been the 
‘neglected middle child’, lost between the 
further and higher education systems.75
Taken together, participation in the four main 
vocational routes do not make up even ten per 
cent of the level of participation in undergrad-
uate degrees in England. New Higher Appren-
ticeships have been welcomed by employers 
and students, they remain few in number.
74 Conlon and Patrignani (2010).
75 Musset and Field (2013).
The gap is particularly noticeable in internation-
al comparison. Like the UK, the US has limited 
intermediate skills but a large graduate supply; 
but the US does much better in delivering 
advanced skills in these more practical modes 
(Figure 65). 
If we are to bridge this gap, we may have to 
see a change in education delivery models, to 
allow a better fit with students’ work commit-
ments. Recent changes have led part-time HE 
enrolments to fall by a quarter even as full-time 
enrolments have grown by 9 per cent (2008/9-
2012/13).
We will also have to see a large shift in those 
levels of employer commitment and investment 
to training. Intermediate vocational learning 
requires intensive employer involvement to 
be a success; high-level vocational learning will 
require more. Employers will need to work with 
education providers in designing vocational 
pathways and ensuring that the right skills are 
developed.
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Figure 64 Training equilibrium, establishments by sector
Source: UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013, Table 129.
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The impact of improving skills
What if some of our key sectors’ acute skills 
shortages were alleviated? Given what we know 
about the higher costs and lower productiv-
ity resulting from skills shortages, it seems 
obvious we would be better off. 
As part of the latest iteration of the Working 
Futures labour market model an alternative 
scenario was developed which explores the 
potential impact on future economic perfor-
mance of an improved skills profile within 
defined industry sectors.
This scenario models an uplift of the supply of 
skilled labour to four sectors:
  Energy
  Advanced manufacturing
  Construction
  Digital and ICT.
Upskilling is modelled as a general shuffling 
of the qualification profile of the workforce.  
The assumed scale of upskilling is considered 
within the plausible bounds for a step increase 
in skills investment. No assumption is made 
about what interventions would be required 
to achieve the assumed uplifts to skills, and at 
what cost, or to whom.
Across the four sectors it results in a relatively 
small number (22,700) of workers moving up, 
each by one qualification level. But the results 
are impressive: in the first three sectors, pro-
ductivity growth improves by 0.1 per cent 
per annum over 10 years, and Digital and ICT 
productivity growth improves by 0.05 per cent 
per annum.  The larger effect comes from 
spillovers as skills shortages are alleviated and 
firms can get on with growing their business.
Over the period 2012-2022 this results in a 
net employment gain of over 150,000 jobs and 
a 1.2 per cent gain in output relative to the 
baseline scenario of Working Futures (Figure 
66).  The latter is equivalent to gaining half of 
an extra year’s growth, achieved from an incre-
mental shift in the skill levels of fewer than 1 in 
1,000 of the UK’s workforce.
Primary sector
& utilities
Manufacturing
Construction
Trade, accomod. &
transport
Business &
other services
Government services
Total Economy
0 10 20 30
% growth in GVA
Baseline Scenario
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
US
0 5 10
% 15−24 in ISCED5B (2012)
Figure 65 Advanced education participation
Figure 66 Projected growth, 2012-2022
Source: UKCES Working Futures 2012-2022. 
‘Baseline’ is the basis of the main projections, 
‘Scenario’ considers upskilling in key sectors.
Source: Eurostat, ‘educ_enrl1tl’, with cohort popu-
lation data. ISCED5B is tertiary education “practi-
cally oriented and occupationally specific”.
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The experience of the last recession has 
shaken confidence that productivity will neces-
sarily rise year-on-year, and that gains in living 
standards will follow. The evidence presented 
in this paper touches on some of the reasons 
why that’s the case. Some of the trends which 
found force in recession had been gathering 
for some time, relatively unnoticed.
There are worries today, as there were after the 
recession in the 1990s, about whether the new 
jobs created by growth are confined to low-skill, 
casual employment. While not complacent, we 
take the evidence presented here as grounds 
for optimism that as continued growth causes 
the labour market to tighten, for the majority of 
people this won’t be a problem.
And if so, that’s positive not only for those 
newly employed in those jobs, but also because 
it allows us to focus on the deeper-seated 
issues we’ve touched on in these pages. These 
are the issues which offer the possibility of 
restoring some of our lost progress on produc-
tivity, and of ensuring decent career opportuni-
ties for all those keen to work hard and invest 
in their skills.
These issues present challenges to govern-
ment, employers, and employees. Those chal-
lenges argue for flexibility and adaptability, for 
long-term investment and making the most 
of the workforce’s skills and talents. Perhaps 
most importantly, they highlight the need to 
be sensitive to the conditions that create the 
problems, and to avoid the assumption that 
there are quick and easy fixes.
Resilient employment
The evidence tells a story of a labour market 
which is highly efficient at getting people into 
work. Through some combination of greater 
flexibility and improved practice, employment 
proved much more resilient to the recession of 
2008-2009 than it had been in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
Considering that the recent recession was far 
sharper than those previous episodes, the 
fact that unemployment increased less and 
recovered more quickly is impressive. Given 
the severe human consequences of unemploy-
ment, things could have been much worse.
There are justifiable concerns about the quality 
of some of the jobs created. There have been 
big increases in ‘involuntary’ part-time and 
temporary work, although even now the UK 
compares well with many other European 
economies. While headline employment is back 
to pre-recession levels, if we exclude those with 
involuntary part-time work there is still some 
distance to travel.
An expanding high-skilled labour market
There’s also good news in the sustained growth 
of high-skilled employment. The UK has now 
one of the highest shares of high-skilled jobs 
among the advanced economies, having grown 
high-skilled work just as quickly as we have 
rapidly expanded the graduate workforce. The 
trend looks to continue, offering many the 
prospect of quality work on relatively high pay.
Efficiency & effectiveness
Headlines
  Recovery allows us a platform to tackle longer term issues: competition makes it a necessity.
  Workplace practice needs to change if we are to achieve lasting gains in productivity.
  Opportunity and performance are intertwined: success in one breeds success in the other.
  Substantial benefits available if we raise workplace practice and performance.
77
EFFICIEN
CY &
 EFFECTIVEN
ESS
Indeed, the international evidence suggests 
that highly skilled people earn a high premium 
in the UK labour market. Qualifications too 
offer substantial earnings returns, and help to 
lower the risk of unemployment.
The long term trends suggest that prospects 
for the high-skilled will only continue to 
improve as the economy grows. The fact that 
high-skilled employment did not, overall, fall 
during recession is a testimony to just how 
robust these trends have turned out to be.
While there is understandable concern about 
‘hourglass’ trends, it is important to remember 
that for the skilled, these trends represent 
significant opportunities. And so far for the 
UK, these opportunities have been greater in 
number than those lost at middle-skill level.
Tough times for the less-skilled
If the UK labour market is a good place to be 
highly skilled, then it can prove a more hostile 
environment for those with less skill. The 
same changes reshaping our economy and 
expanding high-skill opportunity are diminish-
ing the traditional paths to progress through 
low- and middle-skill work.
Part of this decline is the consequence of those 
‘hourglass’ trends. Expanding job opportunities 
outside of high-skill roles have been concen-
trated in service occupations, offsetting steep 
declines in labour-intensive and middle-skill 
roles.
It in some of these middle-skill roles that we 
know we’ve had some of the strongest career 
pathways for those not equipped for high-skill 
jobs. At the same time, service occupations are 
too often characterised by low levels of pay and 
job quality, and without the same established 
pathways to get on and forge a successful 
career.
Limits on opportunity
Just as the highly skilled earn a premium in the 
UK labour market, low-skilled workers seem 
to earn a little less than the average across 
countries participating in the OECD Survey of 
Adult Skills.
But it isn’t just low-skilled workers feeling the 
consequences of limited opportunity. It seems 
that middle-skill workers are at greater risk of 
being left behind. Their jobs aren’t changing to 
complement new technology like high-skilled 
jobs; and they are at the greatest risk of finding 
themselves with skills and qualifications un-
der-used.
For established, experienced middle-skill 
workers, there are reasonable prospects of 
moving up to one of the new high-skilled jobs. 
There is however one group, already hit hard 
by recession, which also seem to be at greater 
risk by changing occupational structures.
Young people have not had the opportunity to 
take advantage of progression through mid-
dle-skill work. They seem to have been caught 
out in a shift in employers’ demand in favour 
of experience at work. They look most likely to 
be forced into a split between low-end service 
work and high-skilled jobs, with at present only 
limited prospects to move between the two 
categories.
The decisive role of the workplace
It’s in our workplaces that our future productiv-
ity will be determined. The setbacks of recent 
years mean that we are now less successful at 
turning employees’ skills into customer orders 
for goods and services. If we are to find out 
way back to rising productivity – the lifeblood 
of long term gains in living standards – then 
we will have to see a substantial change in 
workplace practice for many businesses.
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This question cannot be separated from the 
concerns we can see about opportunity. We 
know we have a long tail of poorly managed 
workplaces. We also know that we have too 
many workplaces where managers seek to 
eliminate skill from job roles – we have a 
high number of employees seeing their jobs 
requiring just primary-level education.
While in some industries new technology has 
allowed for a lower-skill workforce, in others 
it seems to have been used to minimise the 
human element because recruitment, de-
velopment and management is found to be 
difficult. But the consequences are underused 
employees, with poor levels of motivation and 
little opportunity to apply their skills to achieve 
greater productivity and earn better pay.
The Growth through People opportunity
Those setbacks to our productivity bring home 
just how important it will be to make the most 
of all our available skills and talents. Not only 
do we want to make up lost ground, but we 
also want to push on to lasting improvements 
well into the future.
To do that, we cannot leave skills underused 
for want of better workplace practice; not 
when the potential returns are too great. While 
we know we have a labour market efficient 
at getting people into work, we need to see a 
labour market effective at making the most of 
employees’ skills.
Many of our problems can be simply solved. 
The changes driving the ‘hourglass’ labour 
market bring benefits for the skilled, as well as 
cheaper, better quality products and services 
for the consumer. But we need to think about 
how we can help our workforce adapt to those 
changes, and ensure that as the old pathways 
to progression decline, new ones evolve to take 
their place.
Equally, where solutions are possible they 
will often be difficult to implement. Changing 
workplace practice is not in the gift of govern-
ment; while public policy can enable, success 
will depend on businesses making the choice to 
embrace new ways of working.
The UK Commission for Employment and Skills 
has set out a new consensus for action on just 
these questions in Growth through People: a 
statement on skills in the UK. The five priorities 
– backed by employers, employees, as well 
as from education – provide a foundation for 
progress on all of these themes (see opposite 
page).
Looking ahead
The same concerns drive the UK Commission 
for Employment and Skills to continue to seek 
out new frontiers for intelligence on the trends 
in our labour market. Building on our work for 
Growth through People, we are looking ahead to 
further investigations into themes such as:
  Getting in: the changes in the labour market 
for young people, and in particular the 
decline of combined work and study.
  Inequality: how the years of recession and 
recovery have hit upon the labour market 
prospects of different social groups.
  Getting on: hourglass labour market trends 
and their effect on employees’ career 
prospects.
  Workplace performance: further exploration 
of the links between workplace practice and 
productivity.
  Moving up: understanding the strengths and 
limitations of the UK’s expanding high-skill 
labour market.
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E 1 Employers should lead on skills and government should enable them
• We need a new level of leadership from employers to take responsibility for competitiveness and 
growth.
• Employers, working with each other and with their employees and trade unions, should raise the 
bar on skills in sectors, regions and supply chains. Collaboration is vital to building the skills we 
need for competitiveness.
• Governments should commit to supporting employer leadership on skills, individually and in 
partnerships, as a central part of long-term growth plans and a way of aligning public and private 
resources. 
2 Improving workplace productivity should be recognised as the key route to increasing pay and prosperity
• Up to 90 per cent of the current workforce will still be in work in the next decade. To tackle the 
productivity deficit for the economy as a whole, there must be a much greater focus on job 
design, technology and progression for those in work.
• Equipping people with the right skills and giving them the best opportunities to use them will lead 
to better paid jobs.
• This means better leadership and management of people and organisations, increased employee 
engagement and more transparency about the value of people to business success.
3 ‘Earning and learning’ should be the gold standard in vocational education
• We need a step change in attitude and uptake of quality vocational routes into good jobs. High 
quality apprenticeships should be a normal career pathway for many more young people, and a 
normal way for businesses to recruit and develop their talent pipeline. 
• Employers, working collaboratively, should have the lead role in designing apprenticeships to 
ensure they have value in the labour market. The public contribution should be channelled via 
employers to stimulate greater employer uptake. 
• In England, long-term stability in vocational education and training is essential for employers to 
have the confidence to engage.
4 Education and employers should be better connected to prepare people for work
• To create new pathways into work we need to start much earlier. All schools should have links 
with local businesses and use those links to inform and inspire young people about the breadth 
of career opportunities available. 
• Further education colleges should be supported to work with employers to deliver higher level 
technical and professional education to meet the UK’s technical skills gaps.
• Closer collaboration between employers, colleges and universities is essential to ensure there are 
seamless opportunities to work and learn over the course of longer working careers.
5 Success should be measured by a wider set of outcomes not just educational attainment
• We need to align measurement of schools, colleges and universities more clearly with the 
outcomes that are needed for sustained growth through people. 
• These outcome measures should be more prominent in demonstrating accountability and key 
outcome data shared widely with employers, individuals and communities.
• Reliable labour market intelligence should be widely used to support better decision making by 
individuals, employers and education providers.
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